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Abstract: This work aims at examining the development of Private Security Contracting,
specifically Blackwater, and their role in destabilizing the United States’ mission in Iraq.
In that examination, it looks at existing literature on the subject and the efforts that people
involved in the Bush Administration made regarding the War on Terror that allowed these
companies and Blackwater to develop. Choices made by Vice President Dick Cheney,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Bremer all added to the chaos and the
shortage of manpower that would see these companies fill in the gaps in American
planning. This work will also examine Erik Prince, the former owner of Blackwater, and
his role in bringing Blackwater to such a major role in the occupation of Iraq. Lastly, it
will examine how actions taken by Blackwater destabilized the American mission in Iraq
and destroyed good will between the Iraqi people and the United States military.
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Chapter 1
Despite the recentness of the subject of private security contracting there has
already been a massive surge of literature. While little of that existing literature is
historical work, there is still a great amount of writing carried out both on the popular and
scholarly level. While examining this literature two major categories develop. The first
are entire books that focus on the private contractors and their actions in Iraq, and to a
lesser extent Afghanistan. These tend to be developed by journalists or people directly
involved with contracting itself. Thus, they tend to have heated opinions of the system
and what it meant for American policy in the Middle East. These sources also tend to
focus nearly all their attention onto Blackwater, as it represents the largest business
empire to develop out of contracting. The second category contains books about the War
on Terror. Within these accounts, which usually contain more scholarly focus than the
former category, contracting appears as part of a greater story. That does limit the focus
but at the same time it removes some of the personal connection that affects the purely
focused accounts.
In setting about examining both categories of literature, looking at those accounts
solely focused on contracting first seems the most logical step. These accounts are varied
in their messages and what each intends the reader to take away from having read their
work. Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, wrote one of these accounts of the
company and its time in the War on Terror. Prince's account surfaced not
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long after several of Blackwater’s employees were facing charges for murders committed
in Iraq. It stands to reason that, Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the
Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror, had been written to improve public relations.
Prince’s writing also clearly addresses that, as Prince tries to present the company as
much of an underdog which struggled to get off the ground. In Prince’s point of view,
much of the company success happened despite overwhelming adversity. That theme
becomes one of the constants throughout Prince’s account of Blackwater’s rise and fall.1
This theme becomes rapidly apparent in how Prince discusses almost anything to
do with Blackwater. In trying to defend private contracting itself Prince spends an entire
chapter of the book discussing how such practices are quite traditional. Some of Prince’s
examples and comparison are less pleasant than Prince intended, such as declaring
Christopher Columbus his favorite historical contractor and then comparing Blackwater
to the expedition Columbus led.2 Other comparisons that Prince makes include John
Smith and other individuals who helped to settle North America for the European
powers.3

Nevertheless, the point Prince attempts to make with such comparisons is that

nations have always needed the use of private individuals and their companies to
accomplish certain matters of state. In his opinion, Blackwater is fulfilling much the same
role as many others had done throughout history. Prince made every attempt to defend
Blackwater from start to finish and attempting to create better relations with the
American public as well as policy makers.4

1

Erik Prince, Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror,
(New York: Penguin, 2013) 50-55.
2
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 59
3
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 61.
4
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 59-62.
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Proving Prince’s own altruism remains a rather important theme throughout the
work as Prince brings it up anytime there is discussion on expansion of the company.
Prince explains how the contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan were carried out by Blackwater
with the best intentions of patriotism and a desire to help in mind. These elements form
the core of Prince’s argument, which is that Blackwater had every right to be serving
alongside American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and was not the hazard to Iraqi
relations that it had been made out to be.5 Despite having such a point to prove Prince
does use more than just his own experiences as sources and those of Blackwater
employees. Prince’s analysis also includes sources that disagree with the point of view
presented in Civilian Warriors.6
Another of the accounts that focuses solely on just the role of private contractors
and specifically Blackwater in the war on terror is Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s
Most Powerful Mercenary Army. The author of this book, Jeremy Scahill, is a journalist,
who also published several articles on the topic as well as Blackwater. The book is
written to be an extremely revealing work on the actions of Blackwater as a company and
how Erik Prince managed to place Blackwater into such a powerful position within
American policy. It is far more negative than Prince’s own account. Places where Prince
shows readers triumphs, generosity, and national pride, Scahill shows bribery, political
jockeying, and a network of favors. From the start the tone is completely different than
what Prince laid out, opening with Prince facing a Congressional Committee for the

5

Prince Civilian Warriors, 357-359.
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 356-365.
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actions of Blackwater.7 While Scahill crafts a negative narrative for Blackwater in his
book the work is well researched. The notes are filled with government sources
referencing these events as well as other media sources for parts that are more related to
domestic issues. The weighty bibliography makes it clear that these claims are not leveled
without evidence. While Scahill does express suspicion for the stories coming from
contractors themselves they are still mentioned and cited in the bibliography, giving this
account more balance than that of Prince’s.8
Scahill’s work highlights the major divide that occurs on the discussion of Private
contractors. Whereas Prince adamantly defends contracting and Blackwater Scahill
condemns both. As such Scahill quickly points out that while Prince claims to have
struggled to get Blackwater up and running, Prince in fact had access to a multimillion
dollar fortune before even attempting to start building Blackwater. As the son of a
wealthy business owner Prince could easily finance the initial startup of the company
after leaving service as a Navy SEAL. That success against the odds is not found in this
work as it is even pointed out that Prince abandoned people who helped him start the
company.9 Where Prince points struggle, Scahill points out attempts by Prince to make
sure that power was consolidated at a single point, generally himself.10
Scahill also exposes Prince’s numerous ties to American political figures, such as
Prince’s continuous donations to the Republican party. Scahill claims the Republican
party to be a source of the support that Prince would have when Blackwater was

7

Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, (New York: Nation
Books, 2007) 1-5.
8
Scahill, Blackwater, 469-475.
9
Scahill, Blackwater, 49-50.
10
Scahill, Blackwater, 49-55.
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expanding, even claiming it as a possible explanation of why Blackwater could claim so
many contracts from the United States government in the Middle East and at home.11
Blackwater’s connections to occupation officials is also something that Scahill points out
that is missing from Prince’s account. Scahill cites several speeches given by Prince in
critiquing Prince’s account of Blackwater’s history.12 Scahill contends those connections
are paramount to how the company managed to become the giant that it did.13
In Scahill’s account there are none of the flattering success stories that exist in
Prince’s, their two accounts standing opposed on the same event. Anything that Prince
points out as a victory, such as a defense of a government compound in Najaf Iraq. That
defense saw several Blackwater Contractors and American personnel hold out against a
mob attempting to overrun a Coalition Provisional Authority compound. Prince claims
that defense as a victory for Blackwater, pointing out that his men were not only vital to
the defense but invaluable in leading the effort.14 However, Scahill points out the
aftermath of the event as an issue. Scahill reveals to readers how the deaths of several
priests at the Najaf defense started a wide spread anti-occupation movement across Iraq.15
Clearly, as far as Scahill’s account goes there is no clean victory for the men of
Blackwater. The intent to prove that the company was a dubious choice for American
policy makers is quite clear and in many ways well executed. Scahill can show readers

11

Scahill, Blackwater, 25.
Scahill, Blackwater, 26.
13
Scahill, Blackwater, 25-26.
14
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 115-117.
15
Scahill, Blackwater, 60-61.
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the damage done by Blackwater contractors in Iraq, showing how acts of violence could
create a ripple of tensions across the entire nation.16
Compounding Scahill’s account is the argument that American occupation forces
did a great deal to try to hinder Iraqi attempts to seek justice. Scahill cites several
instances of Iraqis either being outright ignored or having their stories blocked from
making it to Western journalists who were in Iraq.17 Often contractors were trusted over
locals and in many reports of these attacks only the contractors’ side of the story was
confirmed for the official incident reports. Importantly, that part of the debate is nonexistent from Prince’s account as it often overlooks Iraqi locals and how Prince’s
company interacted with them, beyond the fact there were threats among the Iraqi people.
Prince largely reduces mentions of Iraqis in Civilian Warriors to almost that of scenery
that occasionally becomes hostile.18 That missing account does little to help Prince’s
telling, as Iraqis seem to play at best a secondary role in that narrative.19
Scahill and Prince represent the farthest extremes of the available scholarship on
Blackwater. Another of the authors to produce work on Blackwater was Suzanne Simons,
a journalist with CNN who wrote the book Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince
and the Business of War. The text serves to report on Blackwater’s actions in the Middle
East and at home. Simons includes a chapter on New Orleans that is further in depth than
Prince or Scahill, and the book also serves as a short biography of Prince. A result of that
is that Simons has Erik Prince himself as one of her primary sources. That does give
Simons information on the early stages of the company and Prince’s life before
16

Scahill, Blackwater, 60-65.
Scahill, Blackwater, 34.
18
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 156.
19
Scahill, Blackwater, 34-40.
17
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Blackwater. Simons does follow Prince’s narrative closely, especially with the
involvement in New Orleans.20 Much like Prince she points out the good intentions
involved in the company moving into the city after, in fact Simons often quotes her
interviews with Prince directly.21 Those direct quotes are something that occur often in
Simons’ account of events, as her interviews with Prince seem to shape her narrative. Her
entire discussion of the Blackwater efforts in New Orleans takes a shape much like that of
Prince’s account of events. The overlap in their story telling becomes apparent not only
in the New Orleans chapter but also several other places throughout her work. 22
Because of that small separation, Simons’ narrative changes in several ways. It
starts to come off that Simons’ writing tries to separate the man from the business,
something that authors like Scahill do not do. In looking at the attacks reported by
Prince’s men Simons points out Prince puts full faith into his employees and did truly
believe their telling of events. Simons tries to leave it up to the reader if that faith was
misplaced or not. Simons also does the same in leaving readers to decide what happened
in some of these events. Simons attempts to give the reader both Prince’s telling and what
was reported by the media at large without saying directly which may or may not be more
correct. She does, however, point out the importance of Iraqis in making these stories
main stream American news.23
The last author and work to be discussed in those focusing solely on private
contracting is Steve Fainaru’s work Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in

20

Suzanne Simons, Master of War: Blackwater USA’s Erick Prince and the Business of War, (New York:
Harper, 2009) 125-127.
21
Simonds, Master of War, 31.
22
Simons, Master of War, 16-19.
23
Simons, Master of War, 160-167.
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Iraq. Fainaru’s work is important in that unlike Scahill and Prince he is not trying to
show the reader a political narrative with private contractors. Instead, he is trying to show
readers who the people involved with contracting were, giving Fainaru’s work a much
smaller focus. Fainaru tries to show readers just who these private contractors are, not
letting them just vanish into the background of the occupation of Iraq as faceless actors.
Instead he spends a great deal of time trying to communicate to his reader who these
people are and how they ended up in their line of work. The contractors he interacted
with for the sake of the book have a good deal of their story told.24
A result of that focus is Fainaru can piece together the communities that private
contractors formed in Iraq, in turn allowing him to cover how the smaller companies
developed a network of rules and networks with each other in Blackwater’s shadow. A
kind of culture formed among these smaller companies that were overshadowed by the
giant that Blackwater became. This insight gives readers some idea how these men
operated on the ground and made unique circles away from the United States military.
That focus gives readers a better grasp on the people who were involved in this system,
the contractors themselves, than many other works on the subject do.25 Another
important aspect of his work is that he includes a great amount of research into the Iraqi
telling of events. This effort creates a balance in that his personal interviews with
contractors are directly contrasted with sources from Iraqis themselves.26
While Fainaru makes use of many interviews to put his text and narrative into
order, there is also research. Fainaru uses those sources to cite many of the facts he is
24

Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting In Iraq, (Philadelphia: De Capo Press, 2008)
78-85.
25
Fainaru, Big Boy Rules, 118-121.
26
Fainaru, Big Boy Rules, 177-180.
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covering and show readers he is not simply going off the top of his head. While these
sources largely tend to be news sources, they are sufficiently varied. The use of sources
beyond his interviewing skills and time spent abroad for the book makes this a well put
together work. Certainly, when it comes to the ground level events of private contracting
and understanding the people operating with those companies it is hard to top Fainaru. By
focusing less on the politics and policy elements of the issue, Fainaru opens new ways to
look at the events that went on in Iraq.27
That limited focus makes Fainaru the only one of these authors to not discuss
what role these people played domestically. While he will discuss what a given contractor
did for a living prior to their employment in Iraq, he says virtually nothing about what
this meant at home. Of these authors, he is the only one who does not discuss New
Orleans or the other ways these companies found employment or influence in the United
States at home. Admittedly, that was not what he chose to focus on but given the amount
of detail he focused into other parts of the book it seems like a loss that he could not
bring that level of detail to bear on those issues as well. It is hard to call that a weakness
but it is something that feels like is missing from this account when faced with the clear
amount of detail in the rest of the work.28
Of the works that focus on the War on Terror and Iraq War the United States
military’s own account of the occupation becomes one of the most important. On Point
II: Transition to the New Campaign, as it is titled, is a book recounting the occupation.
That includes the struggle of the American military and policy makers on the ground to
deal with the transition from invasion to occupation. It is during that period that most of
27

Fainaru, Big Boy Rules, 222-231.
Fainaru, Big Boy Rules, 160-164.

28
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the decisions that would later lead to the massive growth of the private contracting
industry. On Point endeavors to give some insight to when and how these various
decisions were made by occupation officials that would greatly increase the footing of
these companies. Likely one of the most striking is the handing of almost all Iraqi civil
officials; almost all of them were not trusted due to their ties to the Ba’ath party and
Saddam Hussein’s regime.29
The book also can help readers to understand what the American military at large
was doing during these events as well, allowing them to see the parallels between the
response of the conventional military and that of the contractor companies. One of the
most major of these is the uprising of the so-called Mahdi Army, which both Blackwater
and the United States army had to contend with. On Point offers the political meaning of
these events for Iraq itself, giving readers an idea of what the occupation officials who
were mobilizing these private contractors were having to contend with. This book is a
good source when considering the subject as it brings detail to these situations and even
gives readers some idea of the fallout around a given event and what that meant for the
occupation in the short term.30
As far as the early stages of the campaign the book lends a solid idea of what the
onset of the occupation looked like and gives a great amount of detail. While private
contractors are rarely mentioned directly it is still useful to see those overlapping events.
The book is also a vital tool for understanding the chaos of the occupation of Iraq. The
numerous groups and political factions that emerged all wanted to have their say in the

29

Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese. On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, (Fort
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press. 2008) 92-93.
30
Wright and Reese, On Point II, 34-36.
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nation now that Saddam was out of power are well discussed and detailed. The book is
also a good demonstration of how those divisions would be a major source of instability
for Iraq especially as Allied forces scrambled to put together an occupational
government.31 Additional understanding of the campaign into Iraq is a definite aid when
looking at private contracting, making On Point highly useful. The attempts by the
authors to show the struggle of trying to set operations in motion in Iraq gives readers an
idea of the holes that could have developed in planning. Such flaws in planning are
pointed out by the authors to prevent such mistakes in the future. With this being an
official account of the war, improvement is supposed to be the end goal. For the study of
private contracting and Blackwater those holes are places where manpower became thin
and had to be covered by these private security contractors at least initially.32
Given that the book is an official report it is no surprise that it is well researched.
The sources make use of many official documents that deal with the setup of the
occupation in Iraq. Compounding this are several media sources that also weigh in on the
effect these events and decisions had at home. It also uses military sources and other
studies into specific events of the occupation as well, making it clear why this book can
have such good coverage of the many complicated events that were going on around this
time in Iraq. The research clearly plays to this book’s advantage in understanding the
turbulent period it covers. While contractors are mainly only a side mention, the book
contains a wealth of information to use for any reader examining the field.33

31

Wright and Reese, On Point II, 23-26.
Wright and Reese, On Point II, 20-23.
33
Wright and Reese, On Point II, 656-658.
32

12

The next book to discuss also follows the chaos of the United States’ involvement
in Iraq. James Bamford’s A Pretext For War: 9/11, Iraq, and The Abuse of America’s
Intelligence Agencies looks at some of the issues that occurred within American
intelligence that led to the 9/11 attacks and as well as misinformation on Iraq’s use of
weapons of mass destruction. While it strays away from the focus of private contracting it
is of course imperative to have a strong understanding of the invasion of Iraq for this
subject. The development of the war and the invasion that would turn into the occupation
all lay the foundation for that system to develop. Bamford’s examination into the reasons
behind the war and the roles America’s intelligence agencies played in the buildup to the
war is an important look at what would come next. The chaos that he outlines even in the
earliest chapters of his work becomes a theme throughout it.34
Bamford points out the need for reform among American intelligence agencies as
a constant issue, one that would be echoed in the lack of manpower when the occupation
of Iraq began. The lack of personnel in American intelligence who even spoke Middle
Eastern languages was lacking. The ability of those agencies to even respond to those
issues was also hampered as they found themselves hamstrung by their own policies.
While not directly related, such struggles can make it clear to a reader why privatization
would become such a direct answer to many questions for the United States when looking
to the War on Terror. It is also a clear hint to the troubles that the United States would
later face when trying to set up the occupation of Iraq, as these problems seemed to
translate there as well.35

34

James Bamford, A Pretext For War: 9/11, Iraq, and The Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies, (New
York: Double Day, 2004) 67-71.
35
Bamford, A Pretext for War, 113-116.
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Bamford also spends a great deal of time discussing the lack of American
attention to where exactly anti-American sentiment was coming from in the Middle East.
He focused greatly on relations with Israel as a major source of discontent. The arming of
Israel against its neighbors as a Cold War and post-Cold War policy caused a great deal of
animosity in the Middle East toward the United States. Failures to understand local
sentiment quickly became one of the major themes throughout the American operation in
Iraq as well. Bamford does an excellent job in demonstrating how failures to comprehend
the issues earlier would only translate to more issues down the line. He gives readers the
idea that this lack of understanding would remain a problem as it had since the Cold War.
That struggle to grasp these local issues are clearly echoed in On Point, as seen with the
struggle to balance Iraq’s many political, religious, and ethnic groups.36
Bamford’s work shows thorough research into all the topics that it covers. He
combines several government documents and media sources into his work that makes for
a good diversity of sources. His work is a well-balanced account despite the aggressive
argument of its point, which is skillful given that Bamford is tying an administration so
closely to an event. Clearly the evidence was there, as Bamford has the sources to back
up what he says in his notes. The solid research and the important themes set forth in this
book in many ways make it a good opening chapter to reading on Iraq. As such it fits as
an early chapter to this subject and shows readers what problems already existed before
going into Iraq.37
Another of these books that acts as a good opening to understanding the prelude
to the occupation of Iraq and the issue of contracting is Bob Woodward’s Bush at War.
36

Bamford, A Pretext for War, 270-274.
Bamford, A Pretext for War, 380-385.

37
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Like Bamford, Woodward looks at the Bush administration’s actions in heading into the
War on Terror. Woodward takes an entirely different path when looking at the same
things, giving a moderately different impression on the players involved at the White
House. This could be lent to the fact that Woodward had entirely different levels of access
to the administration, in that he interviewed the president and several cabinet members.
These interviews may well have given him an entirely different viewpoint into the
reasoning and plans for going into the war. As such, Woodward’s account provides an
interesting balance point to Bamford’s. In contrast, it seems that Woodward’s goal is less
to see how the administration convinced the public to buy into the war, and more of how
the decision-making process worked at the top.38
Much like Bamford, Woodward has a great deal to say about the American
intelligence community, as that is a major part of the story of the United States entering
the War on Terror. Woodward is certainly not as negative as Bamford and does not point
out the places that these organizations needed reform. Instead Woodward focuses more
on the people involved in these goings-on. Woodward spends time discussing the policies
of Bill Clinton against those of Bush when each of them was president, how intelligence
operated under the two presidents, and how that altered goals and decisions that needed
to be made. The focus on the rapidly changing situation after 9/11 is also a major focus
and Woodward skillfully grounds his readers by showing how major players dealt with
that change.39
Woodward’s focus on the President and the people around him is also helpful. It
gives readers an idea of the actors involved in the various choices made from the top
38

Bob Woodward, Bush At War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), xi-xiii.
Woodward, Bush At War, 5-9.
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down on dealing with the war and decision to move forward. After all, nearly all of these
people would remain the same heading into the later periods of the War on Terror. As
such they remain prominent throughout the Bush administration. The author points to the
fact that President Bush was aware of his own shortcomings on the matters of warfare
and how to proceed. That meant he would need to rely on the various voices around him
and as such those advisors were put into powerful positions of influence. Those positions
turned these people into power players in the administration and important decision
makers, as Woodward points out. Some of these players, like Vice President Dick
Cheney, were also important in the privatization efforts that would become a major factor
in the increasing employment of contractors.40
Woodward covers how Cheney and others became important to the occupations of
both Iraq and Afghanistan. They dealt almost directly with the affairs on the ground in
both cases and making major decisions on how to proceed in both cases. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld became one of the primary decision makers for Afghanistan,
deciding on how to rebuild the military there and restructure the new government as the
question of how to phase out the United States military from shouldering the burden of
governing arose. This instills in readers an idea of how some of these officials could
become so powerful in their given realms of influence. Once again the comparison could
be there to the occupation officials in Iraq itself.

41

Another author like Bamford that deals with American intelligence on the preInvasion planning for Iraq is Scott Ritter’s Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the
Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. Ritter’s
40
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focus is less how American intelligence was exploited and more of how the American
government acted rashly and snubbed the advice and findings of the United Nations.
Ritter points out such oversights as the fact that Iraq admitted the nation had destroyed
nearly all its most dangerous weapons after Desert Storm. Ritter claims those weapons
being destroyed and several other key pieces of information were over looked or ignored,
the United States and even Britain had already planned on the war. Much like Bamford
there is the overlying theme to all of this that the war was unnecessarily preemptive and
that Iraq could have been strong-armed politically.42
As a result of his focus, Ritter gives his readers a solid look at the United Nations
inspection team that was sent in to deal with Iraq. That team’s job after the 9/11 attacks
was to report on the possible weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may or may not hold.
The point of view stands apart; many other authors like Bamford write off the inspection
team to some degree or they are reduced to faceless individuals.43 Ritter does not though,
as he took part in the team and that makes him a vital part of this narrative as a primary
source. Many of the things he mentions he directly experienced or had a hand in make the
account weighty and show that the inspection team could have been taken more seriously.
So, Ritter’s account is important as he tells part of the story that most other people simply
make a footnote. Aside from that it gives a new element to points like Bamford’s that
American intelligence played a major role in this story, though Ritter would claim they
are the trickster and not the victim.44

42

Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and
Overthrow Saddam Hussein, (New York: Nation Books, 2005), 39-44.
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Also, important to note is that despite being directly involved with these affairs
Ritter still has a rather extensive note section. His notes are a combination of sources
referenced and some expanded detail on some points outside of the narrative. Many of his
sources are some of those inspection team documents. There is the occasional outside
source but it seems like Ritter may have mostly relied on many of the things he was
already working on. There is still something to be said of the fact that a lot of this
information is in writing other places but he also has a lot of interviews cited as well.
While not the most varied set of sources in the world there is certainly something to be
said for what research was done. Ritter made efforts to confirm much of what he said in
the book and having friends in American and British intelligence seems to have been a
major aid in that. All in all, Ritter’s account is an important one that gives insight to a
chapter of the events leading into the war with Iraq that many people tend to overlook.
Furthermore, it continues to define American intelligence as extremely important to the
events both before the war and after it started, making them a continuous thematic
element when looking at the war in Iraq for any subject.45
One of the last works to examine is Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro’s Allies
at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq, a work that examines the AmericanEuropean relationship and how it was affected by the war in Iraq. Among the major
points of the book is that the choice to pursue a war with Saddam Hussein led to one of
the biggest divisions that have occurred between the United States and its European
allies. The opening choice to pursue the war was met with hostility by some European
nations, and large sections of European populations also opposed it. Many nations chose

45
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to throw in their support for the actions of the United States despite the demands of their
populations. Such strong divisions show how divisive the issue was not just on the
national scale in the states but also internationally. It was an issue that absolutely
deadlocked the United Nations Security Council. The backlash was certainly there and
that division would be problematic for the United States as it sought allies for the war.
Though the authors quickly point out that such bumps in the relationship with Europe had
happened before this was much more divisive than some of the previous events.46
The authors of Allies at War, like Ritter, point out much of the planning for the
invasion could have been much smoother. Certainly, the European powers felt that Iraq
was a problem that needed to be addressed. The conflict stemmed from the decision to
use brute force as the solution. While there were not many other viable solutions on the
Iraq problem, many European nations felt that a better solution could have been found.
Many of the European nations were surprised by what Ritter pointed out in his work; that
to a degree the Iraqi government was willing to cooperate with the United Nations on the
issue of their various weapons programs. While that cooperation was not to the fullest
extent it could have been, it certainly gave opposing nations like France and Germany
ammunition to use against going to war. This ensured that international opposition was
consistent throughout the proceedings going into the war. Another point that Allies at War
echoes Ritter is the fact that Bush, ignoring various United Nations mechanisms, eroded
international support from the start.47
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The authors of Allies at War also spend a great deal of time discussing the
implications of Iraq becoming part of the war on terror. Fearing another attack on
American soil, the Bush administration declared that they could not only target terrorist
organizations themselves but states that sheltered them as well. While such comments
were originally directed at Afghanistan, that message soon evolved to include Iraq, which
was a problem for many of the European powers. The Bush administration took the
stance that Iraq could not merely be contained quickly led the European nations in dissent
to see what was coming. There is the repeated theme once again of that drive for war by
the Bush Administration that something needed to be done quickly and aggressively. That
same message occurs in this work as well, that rushing off to the war could clearly be part
of the problem. In the case of Allies at War that mistake is twofold. Like in Ritter's work,
it is snubbing the United Nations but taking it a step farther with the twist that it was also
a major upset to American European allies. While the authors do point out that the gaps
created were not unbridgeable they were certainly unnecessary.48
It appears one of the major strands that comes away from reading about the period
leading into the Iraq War is that it was chaotic. Leadership was up in the air with several
figures other than the president having a great deal of influence and the ability to interject
into various issues. It caused a great deal of tension internationally that left the United
States more on its own than it had previously. In examining the literature on private
contracting these elements appear to play into that story, giving readers several elements
that seem to have contributed to that system developing. As well, many of these works
show readers just how divided the literature on private contracting is. With authors like
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Prince and Scahill setting extreme defenses and criticisms of contracting. The scholarship
of contracting seems to lose itself in the debate over if it was an effective or even moral
system. A result of that debate is that examinations on how and why private contracting
became so important in the Iraq war are often lost. While parts of that discussion surface
in some of these works, they are not given as much attention as the political debate. The
origins of contracting’s rise and then downsizing with the collapse of Blackwater are still
ripe for study.
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Chapter 2
In examining how Blackwater and other private contracting companies became so
powerful in Iraq the logical starting point is to look at how these companies developed.
There are several major opinions on how it happened and they vary from each account.
Scahill points toward Vice President Dick Cheney’s tenure as Secretary of Defense as
being one of the primary points of privatization for the American military. Scahill points
out that these developments and the gaps that would open in privatization can all be tied
back to Cheney and his involvement in Halliburton. Not only that, Scahill holds that there
are several instances in the early nineties where American companies became involved
with military affairs; several American companies involved themselves in the wars that
led to the breakup of Yugoslavia. One of the companies was supported by the Clinton
administration to train the Croatian army against the Serbian forces and possibly could
have tipped the balance in that conflict. Cheney’s ties to some of these companies, like
Halliburton, are seen as one of the connections that saw contracting expand.49
Dick Cheney and his ties to Halliburton and several other big companies were
players in the trends and developments that would produce Blackwater. Cheney held
many positions of power throughout the American government and many authors have
pointed out how he used that influence. Cheney’s close ties to George Bush gave
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Cheney a great deal of power as Vice President, as authors like Woodward point out.50
Bush’s attitude toward parts of the decision-making process made him rely on people like
Cheney for support, as they were political veterans. That choice to allow the veterans
around Bush to become more important in the decision-making process than was typical
made Cheney a powerful man. That extra influence would make Cheney a powerful actor
in the War on Terror and that was a position that he would use to his own advantage in
some positions.51
In fact, that influence may be one of the least contested things about Cheney’s
part in the War on Terror and the story of contracting. His tenure as Vice President is
debated as one of the most influential in American history. Some writers even credit
Cheney’s rise to power has a calculated goal for Cheney while he occupied the office.
The increase in the power of the executive branch would not only make the seat of the
president more powerful but his own as well. As such there is some debate as to how
deliberate that concentration of power was. The War on Terror itself made for an
excellent chance to increase the power of that office. Due to the war and several ongoing
trends that saw the powers of the Vice President expanded, Cheney could push himself to
the forefront of the Bush Administration. That increase in power took effort and is one of
the key moments to the Cheney Vice Presidency. Cheney’s connections to private
business interests in turn make for an extremely important subject to examine.52
Some of the use Cheney got out of his position was the increased leverage and
profits that were available to the fifteen companies that he was involved with. Halliburton
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was included on that list of companies and it is thought that many of them benefitted
from their contact with him. It is hard to track how much these companies benefited from
Cheney’s influence, as they did not face impressive increases in the price of their stocks.
Though it is important to note that many of the connections he had with those companies
extended further back than his tenure as vice president, with him sitting on boards at
some of these companies between or before his various political terms. Given those many
positions, there may have been some influences that developed during his tenure in other
offices. Still that information makes it hard to track if Cheney went out of his way to help
many of these companies while he was part of the Bush administration.53
Though it is hard to track the stock increase during Cheney’s time as Vice
President there is something to be said for the profits. Several newspapers were quick to
point out that Halliburton had indeed turned profits from the events of the War on Terror.
In its time in Iraq Halliburton became the seventh largest contracting company and did
turn a profit, though the public relations nightmare that came from being involved did
harm the company to some degree. This reaffirms that their connection to the Vice
President and the war may not have played out as well as some critics point out. Still the
company managed to turn a profit while Cheney was in power and got more than one
contract that it was the sole bidder on. With no other company being considered, this
alone could give the appearance for preferred treatment. It also demonstrates that the
media was going to become an opponent of the war and private contracting itself, with
the American media and left attacking first Haliburton and later Blackwater. 54
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At the same time, some authors like Scahill contend that Cheney’s political career
is one of the turning points in military privatization that would allow contracting
companies to flourish. Scahill makes the claim that Cheney could use his influence as
Secretary of Defense under the first President Bush to start trends that Cheney would
only continue once in the position of Vice President. That tenure as the Secretary of
Defense allowed Cheney to increase the profits of Halliburton by allowing the company
to take over many military logistical functions. Scahill compounds that claim by
discussing that the falling military budget had allowed for such measures to come to pass.
With the military cutting its spending back private companies could move in and replace
the roles that it was giving up. As well the company was tasked with creating a report on
how to further expand that privatization. Clearly, while profits may have not been
obvious from the stocks when Cheney was Vice President there may be other ways that
the companies pushed to expand privatization in the military.55
The role of Halliburton in the Balkans from 1995 until 2000 certainly becomes
one of the major points to look at. The company expanded when it took on no bid
contracts when American forces moved into the Balkans during the NATO and UN
operations there. Halliburton and its associated companies carried out most of the
logistical work for the United States forces there. That period of budget cuts encouraged
those making decisions in the military to seek out these private answers to their supply
problems abroad. This led many to try and defend the practices as successful and cost
effective. Which they may well have been at the time, as United States forces needed to
move into the Balkans rapidly and effectively to carry out the missions for both the UN
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and NATO. The funding for the operations in the Balkans was already small and required
cost effective answers. That low funding meant that a cheap bid from Halliburton was the
readiest answer. Not to mention that the employment of the company there was largely a
success. It proved to be a cheaper than carrying these operations out internally. That
would provide plenty of incentive to employ Halliburton again if the need for that
logistical support arose.56
There were many in the military that were extremely impressed by the outcome of
Halliburton’s role in the Balkans, pointing out the amount saved by the skillfully
managed contract, 33.8 million American Dollars. There are also accounts of how
contractors started to fill in for troops when numbers in the Balkans were whittled down.
There would be echoes of that exact situation in Iraq after the invasion was over. With
contractors moving in to close bases and help with efforts on consolidating those bases
and even taking over some non-combat facilities as they were decreased in size. While at
this point that does not include security needs there is something to be said that the
Balkans seem to have been used as a planning model for how the American government
would later use contractors in Iraq. Oversight did become a key part of these plans,
logistical planners thinking the military should make use of these private businesses but
keep an eye on them to make sure the contract is carried out effectively and with
acceptable means.57 That line of reasoning would be called on again in Iraq after
Blackwater and other contractors proved to unruly without proper oversight.58
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It is also important to mention that the tapering down of the UN and therefore the
United States’ presence in the Balkans as the breakup of Yugoslavia began to cool down
was another of those successes. Contractors for extended periods of time could be
expensive but by quickly downsizing operations in the area the contracts could be
reduced before costs grew too high. A success record like that would certainly have been
considered when contractors were being suggested again later. It was a cost effective and
extremely useful resource in the Balkans conflicts and did in fact fulfill all the tasks that
were needed. That could well have served an important role for many decision makers
looking back at these successes when debating on what to do about the various manpower
issues that developed in Iraq. Combining that success of Halliburton and its related
companies here with the continued decrease in troop numbers across the board seems to
have been a contributing factor. As well the more these contracting companies could
grow the more they took over traditional military roles as well. Halliburton’s contracts in
the Balkans conflict were large but they would only grow in future conflicts.59
Certainly, that confirmed by other sources, as Halliburton became the largest
provider of food in Iraq. Their previous efforts in supply were rather minor compared to
the efforts they would undertake in Iraq. The company clearly grew rapidly at the same
time the contracting system that would affect the occupation began to reach its highest
points. Much like in the Balkans back in 1995 many of these contracts were not open to
competition and Halliburton claimed them rapidly. Not only did the company take over
food transport and supply for the United States military they also took over the repair and
rebuilding of Iraq’s oil industry. The company was the only one in the region with the
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resources and the ability to do so is the reason given for Halliburton getting the contract
with no contest. There could be some argument made that the only reason the company
was already in such a position was due to their already heavy success with the United
States military. Given how important they became in the early nineties that seems a likely
situation for how that was possible just a few years later.60
Those successes in the Balkans made American planners feel like they had a system that would work for the next occupation. An occupation supplemented by contracting
logistics could do well in these circumstances. Due to the relative short term of the Balkans operations it also seemed like this was a cost-effective option. The short-term contracts were the most cost effective means of moving supplies. As planners had time to
consider the successes and how well the plans with Halliburton had been implemented
they clearly saw contracting as a valuable and cost saving resource. They had no reason
to think that there in another occupation contracting could become a problem. With those
successes in mind and seeing that contractors could easily take over traditional military
tasks, American planners became convinced that contractors could fill in for any role they
might need them in. Though they would be surprised later to see that Iraq was an entirely
different situation to the operations in the Balkans.61
As the companies grew and became more profitable they turned to campaign
contributions to gain more influence. As such the larger some of these early contracting
companies became the more influential they could become. The study seems to have
proved that the more a company donates the more contracts it is likely to receive.
Companies like Halliburton that were hired on to fill in gaps that post-Cold War spending
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reductions had caused found ways to become profitable. Thus, they had many reasons to
make sure those contracts kept coming. This would account for these campaign
contributions and the expansion of those contracts.62
So, it does seem that while these companies had no direct profit from their ties to
men like Cheney, there was something to be said for what they could do on their own.
The ability to move capital around and bribe some politicians in the position to help deal
on contracts seems to have been an aid. It is no stretch to assume that these companies’
donations could quickly become something of a rapidly escalating competition, each of
them trying to outdo each other thereby creating a system that profits these contracting
companies and expands their influence. Certainly, such a system would be influential
later down the line, as security contractors became powerhouses. Blackwater’s own Erik
Prince became a well-known donor to many figures in the Republican Party and Bush
administration. A system of donation for reward like this could have become a part of the
story of how the system developed, just like those budget cuts and falling manpower
issues had. This might have allowed these already growing companies to exert more
influence and even increase the number of military affairs they were taking over. Such an
accelerating system could become a factor of how contracting companies could become
such a part of military planning so quickly. There are several elements at work here that
all tie into how and why this system developed. 63
It is also important to look at the narrative Scahill lays out as it includes in it neo
conservatives who would become important to the Bush administration. Not only does
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Scahill point toward Cheney but also Sectary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and an
organization called Project for a New American Century. Among that group's many ideas
was the thought that the American military machine needed an overhaul and that no such
event could occur without a disaster. The 9/11 attacks served that purpose and elevated
some of the members of that group, which of course included Cheney and Rumsfeld.
Both were also supporters of military privatization, according to Scahill. Regardless of
the actual players involved behind the scenes, by the time of the invasion of Iraq there
were nearly enough private contractors on the ground that they held a one-to-one ratio to
American soldiers in Iraq. That sudden shift and development also saw those contractors
lumped into the Department of Defense’s total tally of its manpower. These groups
became part of the American mission into Iraq and Scahill makes it clear that in his mind
they were important in making contractors such a part of the war.64
Scahill also contends that these choices were made by some of these people like
Rumsfeld to try to weaken the Pentagon, the end goal being the lining of their own
pockets through the decisions to privatize many Department of Defense functions. If this
was a “War on the Pentagon” as Scahill claims, it would be difficult to prove but the end
results are certainly there. By the time of Iraq’s occupation setting in contractors already
had a presence in the country under the employment of the Department of Defense. That
huge influx of these contracting companies led to Blackwater’s rise to power. In that rise
it even outshined Haliburton, which had been one of the better established contracting
companies. Certainly, according to Scahill’s account, there is something to be said about
the aftermath of these ideas to rebuild the American military. Something about them
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clearly had an influence, increasing the ability of these companies to become part of the
American War on Terror.65
In trying to make those connections to these key players like Rumsfeld it is
important to look at the things they have said about the issue. One of the works that
Rumsfeld wrote about the rebuilding of the American military is cited by Scahill and
gives insight to the former Secretary of Defense’s outlook on how American defense
should face reconstruction. In Rumsfeld’s own account of events he started to view the
need for military change differently after a visit to Afghanistan. There, Rumsfeld saw the
combination of American Special Forces and local allies that helped to bring down the
Taliban regime there. Rumsfeld praises the offensive there and how the combination of
modern American tactics and munitions managed to develop into an efficiently
functioning attack strategy. Though he does extoll the importance of those modern and
guided munitions that made the employment of the Afghani forces on the ground a viable
tactic, at the same time he stressed the importance of innovation and changing old ideas
to fit the new and evolving battlefield. One of Rumsfeld’s main thrusts here is that the
military must plan for ever changing threats; the Cold War was over and the new world
would not provide the same consistent threats.66
At first look this would not seem to present the push for more privatization in
military efforts. Indeed, at first it seems like a more generalized push for the continued
evolution of American military tactics and strategy. Rumsfeld also focuses in on that
change from Cold War policy, pointing out that the Cold War tended to have similar
issues and solutions, the constant back and forth of the arms race being one of the
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examples that he brings up to make that point.67 The shift from those Cold War habits
were what left the defense stratagem of the United States vulnerable to the constant
changing world that had now developed in the aftermath. With the Soviet Union gone, so
too was the idea of the United States having a foe it could easily predict and maneuver
around. Rumsfeld holds that this is what had weakened the American military.68 These
first few points give the article the feeling of just a call for reform among the military,
certainly not as aggressive as was implied by Scahill. That tone shifts rapidly as
Rumsfeld moves further into discussing why Cold War policy should be transitioned
out.69
Not long after setting into those issues Rumsfeld starts discussing the ideas that
the United States’ standing forces for the Cold War could be too much. There could be
cuts to manpower in favor of focusing resources into deterrents that would focus on more
on ways to prevent threats. He declares that a reduction in forces would not reduce
deterrence felt by the targets of American forces and they would still be able to occupy
and deal with a single threat effectively. That is something, which sounds familiar, a call
for the reduction in the standing forces of the United States. Reducing the active
manpower would be one of the primary issues that would later occur in the occupation of
Iraq. The standing force that was supposed to be enough to occupy a hostile capital and
pave the way for the regime change appeared to have a struggle in doing so after these
cuts. As well, Rumsfeld calls for moving away from plans that were put in place to defeat
specific enemies and instead general plans that minimized threats to the United States and
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closed possible weak points. While some parts of this logic seem sound, such as knowing
that few enemies of the United States would plan for conventional war with it, other parts
such as the elimination of plans for specific enemies seems less sound.70
Importantly, while Rumsfeld calls for the elimination of some American
manpower he does call for increased military spending. Much of that spending would be
spent not on troops but instead on new developments, new technologies that could reduce
the amount of men needed on the ground. The lessons learned from Afghanistan proving
to some, possibly Rumsfeld, that some of these regime changes could be done with
relatively few men with solid technical support. Directly referenced in this area of his
article is that idea that the American government needs to increase in programs to deny
protection to enemies of the United States. Scahill holds that thinking to be thinly veiled
plans to strike at Iraq. Combined with earlier mentions of weapons of mass destruction
being a major threat to the security of the United States, there is certainly a case to be
made for that argument. Rumsfeld is clearly pushing for new military developments and
outlying a vague idea of what enemies of the United States will look like in the near
future and much of it sounds like Iraq.71
While it is clear there is some push for the invasion of Afghanistan it seems hard
to say there is anything here that could directly be pointed out as a call for private
contractors. There is certainly something to be said for the fact there could clearly be
holes in these plans that would cause more contractors to be hired than previously had
been. The plans, which revolved around the need for a reduced number of troops and
instead focusing on smaller, more well-supported troops, brings this to mind. Given that
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contractors started to fill gaps in manpower when occupying Iraq, it seems those reduced
troop numbers may have been an issue. The calls for the elimination for plans that were
designed exactly for a given hostile nation may have also been an issue. In an occupation
knowledge of the enemy nation could be vital; without a plan tailored to occupying a
given nation it could make such a military investment more problematic. Those problems
became more apparent as Rumsfeld makes it clear that development of new weaponry
could be more important in eliminating these threats than a change in a state’s leadership.
These elements appear to be traceable to an issue that would later appear in the
occupation of Iraq.72
The connection to Iraq is only furthered by the fact that Rumsfeld repeatedly calls
for the use of preemptive action, claiming this won’t just win wars but prevent them.
Many other authors have pointed out the preemptive strike against Iraq was something
that would come back to haunt the United States. While Rumsfeld does not directly
reference any country in the Middle East other than Afghanistan, knowing the other
regional current events at the time of his writing make it hard to dispute that he is
discussing Iraq. Largely, in this writing Rumsfeld found a way to discuss the possibility
of an invasion of Iraq behind the ideas of military reform. His calls for being ready for
any threat and the framing of those threats, such states that support terrorism or have
weapons of mass destruction provide several hints to that point. These later points,
combined with things like his discussion of regime changes, outline some of the issues
that would accelerate privatization in the military field.73
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Those issues with the occupation of Iraq are just some of these common threads.
While it comes late in his writing Rumsfeld does make a subtle push that could be taken
as a call for privatization. Largely, that comes in the form of how Rumsfeld discusses the
way that new military reforms should be undertaken; new ways to approach the budget
take on business like language, how to invest funds more effectively and similar terms.74
The idea of handling military funds like a business is not all that unheard of but mixed
into this is once again the call for reduction in personnel. While calling for an increased
budget and looking at better ways to spend that money Rumsfeld also declares it is better
to spend that money on things other than “shooters.” This is not a direct line to
privatization but when an author is pointing out that the United States has more
responsibilities in defense but doesn’t need as large of a standing force it sends a
message. It certainly leaves the way open for private contracting to develop to reduce
those American forces. Increasing the budget does mean they could be more easily hired.
While privatization may not have been one of Rumsfeld’s direct goals, his attitude that
the Department of Defense needed to behave more like “Venture Capitalists” may hint
that he was not entirely opposed to it, perhaps even hinting at some of this rhetoric as
veiled language toward using the private sector more.75
This is not quite as dramatic as Scahill's claims but certainly there is much to be
said that the attitude in his discussion on reforming the military leaves the path to greater
privatization open. It is difficult to say if Rumsfeld’s thoughts in going into the war with
Iraq he had the same mindset as men like Erik Prince, who would make the comparison
between Blackwater and FedEx. Prince stated that the private sector is generally regarded
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as far more effective compared to its public-sector peers.76 While some of the points that
Rumsfeld made could have clearly made the events leading to the increase in contracting
possible it seems unlikely that he had that intention openly. Certainly, while his statement
that the Department of Defense could benefit from a private sector outlook makes it clear
he is not uncomfortable with the idea of privatization, it doesn’t seem that is his goal. At
worst his writing implies he was open to the possibility and was promoting a Doctrine of
Preemption but still felt that conventional American forces with better technical support
could do what they needed to do. That, combined with the fact that Rumsfeld seems
impressed with American ground troops in Afghanistan makes it seem unlikely he would
desire to replace them, though he would not be opposed to supplementing them. 77
An important organization that Rumsfeld and other key players, like Dick Cheney,
copied many of its ideals from was the Project for a New American Century. The Project
for a New American Century had a lot to say about the reinvention of American forces as
well. In a document, titled Rebuilding America’s Defenses the organization set out to
outline the ways it would do so. With the Project's many connections to important
politicians it could gain influence with its ideas.78 Rebuilding America’s Defenses itself is
a dense document that brings up many issues that it feels should be addressed as the
twentieth century was ending and how the United States might address those issues as it
was faced with the prospect of being nearly unchallenged on the world stage at the end of
the Cold War.79
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Importantly, the document makes many of the same references as Rumsfeld later
would in his own work. The studies Rebuilding American’s Defenses references were the
same as many of those he would later cite, showing that connection in ideology.80 Those
overlaps in thinking show themselves quickly as the text moves to discuss the shrinking
defense budget as a shocking sign of things to come. One similarity is, the shared idea
that nuclear armament should likely be dialed back without the threat of the Soviet Union
in the way.81 It does stray from Rumsfeld in calling for the actual increase in the standing
forces of the United States as the author of Rebuilding America’s Defenses makes it clear
that it is likely there will be more operations requiring American forces on the world
stage.82
Much like Rumsfeld the report calls for a great deal of technological reform as
well. Once again, most reforms need to be made tactically and in the most cost effective
way possible.83 Projects that offer improvements but nothing revolutionary should be
passed over for things that improve air power and network security consistently. Clearly,
this echoes some of those same ideas that Rumsfeld would later draw on in his own
report on how to rebuild the United States military forces. Importantly that includes the
shared ideas of becoming more “private sector” in mindset just like Rumsfeld had called
for. The idea that the Department of Defense could profit from being run like a business
does seem to be a recurring thought throughout these discussions, though it is much more
present in this report than in Rumsfeld's writing.84 Clearly, the Project for a New
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American Century certainly had more of an overt feeling toward privatization and it is
clear Rumsfeld gleaned some influences from the report. This could mean that Rumsfeld
may have been more open to privatization efforts than he appeared to be in his own work.
Instead of overtly advocating for privatization, since that could have started a media
backlash, as Blackwater later would, Rumsfeld may have used other policies to work
toward privatization as an end goal. Certainly, Rumsfeld seems open to privatization and
many of the issues in his planning paved the way for it to happen, so it seems there was
something happening below the surface of Rumsfeld’s planning.85
It is also important to note that the report details that falling numbers in American
personnel may become an issue when trying to project American power abroad. In calling
for the increase in budget the report discusses some of the issues with the budget, as it
stood at the time of writing, much smaller than it had been prior to the collapse of the
Soviet Union. While the report does try to focus that falling budget onto things like
nuclear armament, there is some suggestion that a standing conventional force should be
a priority as well.86 Falling troop numbers could complicate the goals of the United States
on the world stage. That point serves as one of the major differences from Rumsfeld. The
report claims that on paper current forces appear to be enough, but that is in a best-case
scenario and given that the occupation of Iraq became such a major issue it was not that
best case. That dialogue of privatization combined with dropping troop numbers appears
to have set in motion the future manpower issues that would occur in Iraq.87
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The report has some places where it trails off to discuss the importance of
American power across the globe. One of the primary goals that it claims the United
States should pursue is to make sure that no other major power develops. This not only
gives the Project's document a much clearer feeling of privatization but also one of
American imperialism. The United States and its allies must remain the only dominant
forces after the fall of the Soviet Union, according to this report. That call for American
influence to be pushed across the globe is compounded by calls for that influence to be
confirmed in areas where American influence is already strong. The report focuses on
redeploying American forces away from Europe and instead pushing American power
into East Asia. That, combined with some of the other overtures of the report, such as
declaring prevention of the rise of another world power as a goal, makes it appear that the
authors of the report saw China as a possible threat. That only appears compounded when
the report discusses several times the growing nuclear power of China.88 This scenario,
used to balance the calls that while nuclear weapons should no longer be the focus of
American defense, they should not be forgotten.89
Rumsfeld also seemed to be greatly concerned with the ability of American forces
to project their power across the globe. While from Rumsfeld’s writing it is clear that he
had no interest in the target of that projection being East Asia as with the Project of the
New American Century, Rumsfeld clearly feels that the United States needs to throw its
weight around. While Rumsfeld does discuss that, there will be changes away from the
Cold War mindset he still advocates the use of American power abroad. It is not as direct
of a call as in Rebuilding America’s Defenses but it is still there. The discussion that the
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United States must act aggressively in some instances to defend its own best interests
makes it clear. Once again it seems Rumsfeld used some of these ideas to his own ends,
changing them enough that they could be tailored to a Middle Eastern policy. Such
discussions on the imperialism of the United States would become a constant feature of
the debate about the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The contracting companies that
would develop in that occupation also became deeply tangled into that story as well.90
While the report did push for East Asia as the major area of America
redeployment it did not forget the Middle East. Desert Storm was a fresh memory at the
time it was written and that shows. It directly names Saddam Hussain as an issue in the
region and that air missions there will likely not end if Saddam remains in power. Though
the call there is not to ever topple Saddam, the report calls to contain Saddam into Iraq
even more effectively by increasing the American presence to the point that carriers
would likely not have to stay in the Persian Gulf. The call there to contain Saddam is
stands out as it almost perfectly echoes Cold War policy. There is no real reason to take
the fight to Saddam in the eyes of the Report. As long as Saddam cannot strike American
allies he is a non-threat that merely just needs to be watched and defended against. This
viewpoint completely opposes Rumsfeld’s later call for preemptive action if necessary to
protect the United States. That dynamic of anything that would call for more troops being
removed from how he used the report becomes striking.91
Largely, it appears that while Rumsfeld drew major influences in his writing from
the report and the ideology of the organization behind it, Rumsfeld clearly altered it a
great deal. If Rumsfeld had advocated for such ideology in its original form, there would
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not have been the calls in his work to reduce the amount of personnel in the military.
Rumsfeld focuses instead on using the expanded military budget he calls for almost
solely for technological advances. Rumsfeld makes it clear that he much prefers the
combination of high-tech support combined with Special Forces on the ground as
opposed to using more conventional military troops. The idea that shrinking numbers
could be cost effective and free up more resources for more cost effective and efficient
developments may seem sound but the use of ground troops appears more important in
retrospect than Rumsfeld thought. While Rumsfeld’s approach for flexibility and cost,
effective research go along the original ideas of the report, but doing so while espousing
the idea of increased military numbers appears to have put holes in the plan, as that call
for more troops appears to have been a vital part of the plan.92
Largely, the report’s focus on increasing manpower as a deterrent to small
regional threats like Saddam would have never allowed for the development of the major
manpower shortages that would develop later in the occupation of Iraq. Some of those
possible future issues that the report points out later becoming fact during Iraq’s
occupation. The report’s authors did not necessarily condone preemptive attacks with the
military, instead preferring to use shows of force to keep American power well grounded.
In many ways, the original ideas of the report seem to have had more foresight then
Rumsfeld. It planned for not just new research developments but also, increasing troop
numbers across the board and using those troops as a deterrence as well as, possible
forces for any minor theater war. These expansions in troop numbers are not even that
extreme. It also discusses on how to move troops out of now non-critical regions, such as
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parts of Western Europe, and using them to fortify new hotspots that are currently
undermanned in comparison. The authors of the report may have never had their plans
tested, but Rumsfeld in expanding on their ideas may have indirectly contributed to the
rise of private contracting. His call for fewer troops, combined with the direct assertion
that preemptive action could and should be employed, had a great influence on how the
war in Iraq would play out.93
Rumsfeld’s push for a generalized plan is a major step away from the report. The
report’s focus on how to engage every region is snubbed by the idea that Rumsfeld thinks
a general idea can engage every threat the same way. The idea that two hostile nations
can be engaged in the same manner is certainly an oversimplification and may well have
also led to problems in Iraq. Whereas, several plans on how to deal with each threat
seems like it may be a sounder decision when engaging on the world stage. The idea that
Iraq could be handled the same as a threat from the Balkans could be an issue when
occupying forces no longer have a set plan on how to deal with the cultural differences.
These various struggles in the Rumsfeld planning could well have been a reason why a
lot of the planning of the occupation of Iraq happened after the invasion had already
ended.94
Overall it appears that the drop in military spending after the end of the Cold War,
the reduction in troops, as well as political maneuvering allowed contracting companies
to rise. That rise was not overnight but did happen relatively quickly with the time
between the operations in the Balkans and the occupation of Iraq, which would be the
height, being less than twenty years apart. Choices were actively made by Rumsfeld,
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which showed some of the faults in thinking on post-Cold War global strategy. At the
same time politicians with ties to these companies, like Cheney, appeared to have helped
pave the way by cooperating and forming alliances with these companies. However,
those influences are far from the only ones that helped contracting reach its height. There
are plenty of other players in the evolution of contracting left to be addressed.
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Chapter 3
Another set of extremely important actors in the rise of private security
contracting are Erik Prince himself and Paul Bremer, the head of Iraqi’s Coalition
Provisional Authority. Prince was the owner and driving force of Blackwater, using
political ties, donations, and personal contacts to grow Blackwater into the largest of its
kind to exist. Prince was one of the leading actors that may have even unintentionally
exploited those various developments that opened the military to more privatization.
Aside from Prince was Bremer, the leading occupation official in Iraq. Like other
political figures mentioned in this work, Bremer made choices during his time in power
that helped to facilitate that rise. Bremer and the occupation officials around him were
guarded and escorted by Blackwater and smaller contracting company employees. That
patronage would help these companies become a major part of the occupation policy. As
well Bremer and other occupation officials went to great lengths to defend these
contractors from repercussions for their actions. Thus, these two were highly influential
in how the contracting system would develop and the exact route it would take as the
occupation developed. In short, the steps taken by both Prince and Bremer served to
confirm all those trends that had already been developing.
Prince himself had grand ambitions for Blackwater and is not shy about sharing
them. Prince’s own book states quite clearly that his end goal for Blackwater was to
become a privately owned fourth branch of the military. Given the sheer size of the role
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the company would eventually come to play in Iraq it seems like that goal was almost
accomplished. Blackwater became a major player in the occupation under Prince’s
leadership and prior to that expansion it had been a major player in government training.
Blackwater as a company was well connected from the start. The company’s origins as a
weapons training facility likely played into its favor, as government personnel from
several agencies came to the impressive gun ranges located at the Blackwater training
grounds. That gave the company access to many people in important political positions
dating back to the mid and late nineties. Access like that would be a boon after 9/11 when
Prince, aware of the manpower issues in both Afghanistan and Iraq, opted to approach the
CIA to see what Blackwater could do to help.95
That approach gained Blackwater one of its first major contracts defending
American posts in Afghanistan. While their role in Iraq would be the centerpiece of the
company’s rise to power, it started out helping fill the significant gaps in American
manpower in Afghanistan. After all, there had been few American troops deployed there
as Special Forces operating with local allies handled the operations. That meant that after
the fall of the Taliban, security in the area had completely collapsed. The CIA operating
in the area needed someone to protect and guard their compounds and, despite Afghani
allies, preferred to be defended by someone from outside of the country. That contract
may have only been the first push made by Blackwater but it birthed the security division
of the company. As far as business developments go that was one of the largest steps that
could be taken by the company, as it allowed for everything that came after. Blackwater's
status as one of the first companies to operate on a government contract was likely
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favorable to getting further contracts as well, though Prince claims that all future
contracts were won with competitive bids against rival companies. 96
Although Prince claims that his political connections were lacking, the result was
that Blackwater acquired a contract with no competing bids allowed. The reason: Prince
had helped train someone at the CIA’s son and knew people there thus. That connection,
combined with Prince’s attempt to even join the CIA at a point, which may have been a
political move, made many people in that agency aware of Blackwater. Clearly, those
personal connections did matter despite how much Prince might claim it was not the case,
as Prince says he did not have the time for contacts. Prince appears to have had a skillful
ability at spreading the name of Blackwater by word of mouth. The company’s success as
a training facility may have helped to do that as well; a staff skilled enough to train Navy
SEALs could surely be up to guarding checkpoints. Prince claims that Blackwater could
do so well because all the power in making decisions was focused on him. Without the
limitations of stockholders or boards to answer to he could act as quickly as he needed.
Without needing to answer to anyone, Blackwater was just a simple order away from
being on location and acting on behalf of whatever contract they could secure.97
Oddly that is a point that both Prince and Scahill echo. Scahill’s claim focuses on
that concentration of power being one of the things that allowed Blackwater to grow so
rapidly. The point Scahill elaborated was that Blackwater functioned much like an army
with Prince at the head as the sole individual who could make decisions. Compounding
that are the claims Scahill makes that show that many of the people who helped Prince
found the company eventually stepped away from the company. If it was an intentional
96

Prince, Civilian Warriors, 57.
Prince, Civilian Warriors, 50-51.

97

46

move, as Scahill claims, it is hard to prove. Either way Prince was the sole executive
power behind the company. That would be a position he would maintain until he
eventually sold off the company once it became clear he could not make a comeback
from the public relations disaster Iraq became. Prince’s hold on power until that point
may well have been how Blackwater managed to outmaneuver so much of the
competition and come to be so central to the occupation of Iraq.98
Apart from that essential consolidation of power, another element that played into
Prince’s favor was his wealth. Prior to leaving his tenure in the Navy SEALs Prince was
a wealthy man. An inheritance gained from the death of his father put him into an
excellent financial position. That wealth not only allowed him to finance the creation of
Blackwater but also allowed him to keep the company running under almost any
circumstance. Selling his father’s businesses only increased the amount of resources that
Prince had at his disposal once Blackwater was fully established, Prince being a
multimillionaire before even setting out.99 That wealth was what allowed Prince to get by
without a board of directors or stockholders. The company was Prince’s because of the
amount of capital he could bring to bear. In some cases, that may be another large
advantage Prince had over the competition, to the point that in many cases Prince’s men
were armed out of his own personal weapons collection. That ability to bankroll
Blackwater and provide for it had a great deal to do with its success. Scahill holds that
Prince’s wealth was the key to the company being able to start at all. Such a large training
facility would have been impossible without a massive amount of capital. That wealth
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would be important when trying to make Blackwater successful through political
means.100
Regardless of the means, Prince and Blackwater made an impression and was set
up to acquire further contracts that would allow the company to expand. Also, helping the
company to spread its name was Prince’s connection to several politicians through his
habit of campaign contributing.101 While Prince himself makes little to no mention of
doing so, it is something that Scahill points out aggressively. Given Scahill’s habit of
trying to create a grand narrative of the massive push for privatization that seems
obvious. In this instance, at least, there may be some more merit to that effort. After all,
given that contractors who tend to give more in contribution tend to receive more
contracts it would make sense that Prince would gladly donate. Prince's dream of
Blackwater as the fourth branch of the military was rapidly becoming a possibility. It is
also important to note that Prince also was carrying out a family tradition as his father did
donate excessively as well. Both men donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to various
politicians, making sure that the wealth of the Prince family saw some use in politics.
Prince may have gotten more of a return on that money than his father ever did.102
It is important though to see how Prince used those donations to try and increase
his standing and by extension that of Blackwater. As mentioned, Prince and his family
had donated to politicians for some time, that money going exclusively to Republicans.
Prince advanced with that idea and continued to donate to Republicans as he founded and
then put Blackwater into motion. Even prior to founding the company Prince was
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somewhat active in politics, despite Prince’s claims to not being that political of a person
and wanting to stay out of politics. The fact Prince was involved in politics, at least
nominally through donations, prior to founding Blackwater seems important. It may be
that he just intended to continue being involved as he had been prior to starting
Blackwater. Certainly, that is one way to look at it, especially given how much of a
family tradition it appeared to be for the Princes. It is still hard to ignore how much
Prince had to gain by donating to politicians, as that would only help Blackwater. The
political right would be a constant ally to Blackwater and other contracting companies.103
As much as Prince would like to lead readers to believe that he was not political,
research into Prince’s donation records quickly prove otherwise. Clearly, he kept up the
family tradition of donating to conservatives and even took it further, tending to several
thousand more than his father usually would and donating more often. There were a few
of the donations that were directly funded by Blackwater itself, with Prince acting as the
owner, but there are plenty from Prince as an individual. Those donations range from
everything from politicians who are running for the United States senate to people
running for state level offices. Usually these donations are either claimed by one of
Prince’s smaller companies or “Prince Group” a company set up by his father for what
appears to be only donating purposes. Those two donations from Blackwater itself were
helping to fund a run for the Senate and one for a governor position. It does make those
two donations stand out but it is hard to say why Prince would break from his normal
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donation cycle and give to someone directly from Blackwater. The donations from Prince
do seem to follow a trend that contradicts some elements of Prince family tradition.104
While Prince was politically active prior to building Blackwater or its rise to
power Prince’s donations were much less prior to that. Before the security division of the
company was founded Prince’s donations records number only about eight total
contributions, most of which are at least a thousand dollars with one only being five
hundred. After that development, though, Prince’s donations become much more
numerous. Every year there are multiple donations to both state and federal campaigns.
There seems to have been something that drove Prince to donate more once Blackwater
was fully up and running and had the security division operating. That may well have
been the motivation to gain more contracts as well as honor old alliances and friendships
that his father had built when he was the one donating. Regardless, the sheer amount that
Prince was donating, usually at minimum of a few thousand dollars, may well have been
designed to gather as much political favor as possible. Given that contracting companies
tend to profit from donations that seems like it may have been the case. That sudden rise
in donations does seem to mimic the rapid rise of Blackwater through the early two
thousands. It is worth noting that Prince’s donations did not stop after the collapse of
Blackwater, though they did slow, and have made another major rise in the last election
cycle.105
That may well be an attempt to bring back his political clout which was nearly
destroyed by the havoc Blackwater unleashed in Iraq. Once again that is hard to prove but
Prince’s sudden return after a major drop off is interesting. After 2006 Prince’s donations
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dropped lower than they had been prior to the year 2000, only donating around ten times
total in that period compared to over twenty times prior to Blackwater’s collapse.106 That
overlaps with the period after he had sold out of Blackwater and the company was
moving on without him. The remaining parts that he still had control over found
themselves handling relatively minor contracts in Afghanistan that dealt with training
local police and security forces for when they would eventually be taking over those roles
from the Americans who were still carrying them out. With such a plummet in what his
companies could do and the number of contracts they had sinking to rock bottom, it
appears Prince no longer had reason to donate.107 That does pose a problem for the
narrative that Prince had any reason do this for anything other than business reasons. The
donations from the post 2006 period are limited in scope and usually came up only in
periods when major federal elections were ongoing. Prior to that period Prince was
donating to someone at least every year and that suddenly dropped off to points when
there were years he did not donate at all. Those years were off years for elections but that
had not previously stopped him from backing campaigns.108
Following that drop off was a massive resurgence in donations by Prince through
various companies. In the period leading up the 2016 elections Prince was clearly at
work. Prince donated money to various Republican candidates, and the number of
donations far outmatched what it had been in the last few years combined. In fact, within
just a month he had donated to twenty-three organizations just prior to the election. That
sudden reappearance onto the political scene stands out, given its timing. It seems that
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when there was little to gain, such as the collapse of Blackwater from its business empire,
there was also little reason to donate. Though when there was a chance for a major
shakeup, which the 2016 election cycle certainly offered, Prince was encouraged to step
forward more than Prince had been previously. Given Prince’s huge surge in donations it
certainly seems that Prince was more than ready to take part in this election cycle. Those
donations also ranged in amount from several thousand dollars to a hundred thousand.
This marked a massive increase in not just the number of donations but the amount per
donation that Prince was willing to throw at these campaigns, as previously Prince had
never donated more than twenty thousand in any single donation.109
On looking at these donation records it appears hard to defend anything other than
the fact that these donations were politically motivated. Prince’s cycle of political
donation fell off perfectly with Blackwater's decline, only to rise again as the politics of
the United States were rocked by the 2016 election cycle. It appears that Prince may have
taken that upheaval as a chance for him to start again after falling off the scene with the
collapse of Blackwater. It may also have been a gambit to avoid trouble after running
afoul of United States intelligence by attempting to start security companies in Libya
with the end goal of being paid to block refugees. That attempt to start companies abroad
also says something important about Prince’s motivations. One way or another he was
determined to make his plan for Blackwater or, a company like it, to succeed. Prince’s
attempts to create these private security companies elsewhere in the world speak to that.
Operating outside of the United States or out from under its jurisdiction makes these
companies much closer to traditional mercenaries in a legal sense, with the roles these
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companies were looking at undertaking not being escorting and defense but full on
stabilization efforts. These are roles that far outstripped anything even Blackwater had
done, as operating under the United States limited that company to purely defensive
roles. 110
Aside from his attempts to create these companies elsewhere in the world Prince
managed to run some contracts for other nations and even the United States. His various
attempts to create these companies saw efforts across the Middle East and Africa. All of
this was done with money that might have been from a Chinese company. Prince’s
connection to foreign companies based in China may well have been part of the reason he
became politically active once again after 2010. Holding positions in those Chinese
companies may have looked as bad for his image as his attempts to develop Blackwater
style companies abroad. Those companies themselves took steps against Prince when it
became apparent Prince may be trying to use their funds for such a purpose. Clearly,
whatever Prince was up to in the six years between selling off Blackwater and the sudden
reappearance in playing politics did not increase Prince’s credibility. However, those
opportunities Prince found abroad might have proven to be an important source of capital
for this sudden return to the political world. Regardless, it was clear that Prince was
determined to try and stay involved with business ventures wherever possible.111
That fact that Prince moved to become politically involved again after these
efforts were discovered does open some important questions. Did Prince intend to make
this move prior to being caught, and is this an attempt to resurrect his business empire
within the United States? Or was this an attempt to use rapid development of political
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favors to get United States intelligence officers off his back? It is hard to tell which of
these is the case but both might be true. Prince’s attempts to start these foreign companies
and the sudden return to donating politically may just be that drive to carry out Prince’s
long-standing vision: the creation of a company that would operate as a fourth branch of
the United States military. If that company had to be funded by side ventures like his
attempts in Libya, that appears to be what Prince was willing to do. Though once caught
attempting to put those companies in motion it may well have been in Prince’s best
interest to try and make political allies again as the election neared. It is clear these most
recent donations had some sort of raw motivation behind them, be it a comeback or
escape.112
Regardless of motivation Prince seems to have always had something to gain with
campaign donations, whether gaining contracts for the security and training divisions of
Blackwater or trying to block investigations into Prince’s business ventures taking place
outside of the United States. Once again, money is always tangible into how private
contracting plays out in the United States. The ability to move capital and develop
political favors appears to have been priceless in Blackwater’s rise. The more money the
company could procure the more it could share with political allies to help ensure they
reached office or remained there. Those political allies would in turn use their positions to
try and secure more contracts or help the company avoid trouble, such as some of those
figures trying to block the committee on oversight that was put together to question
Prince about the company. This symbiosis created a cycle that saw these two groups grow
to defend each other and allowed for Blackwater to become such a giant in the
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occupation of Iraq. That relationship may have influenced why the left and the media
would become so hostile to Blackwater and other contractors.113
All those elements make Prince the leader that a company like Blackwater needed
to become so successful. Massive amounts of personal capital, concentrated control, and
the ability to develop both personal and financial political ties were all key elements of
Blackwater's success. All these tie together to present Prince’s contribution to helping
Blackwater rise in fame. That contribution was a large part of the company’s rise, as
without Prince it is likely a company like Blackwater may have struggled to get much
bigger than a gun range. Prince had both the ability and means to take advantage of the
various flaws that had created the manpower shortage within the United States military.
That desire to create and pioneer a company that would become the fourth branch of the
military appears to have been a driving force in elevating Blackwater. It does appear that
Prince was the head of a business empire and did a great deal to make it so. Though as
important a role that Prince played in bringing Blackwater to power, Prince is not the
only one to make such a major impact on the rise of contracting.
Another of the important figures is Paul Bremer, as without the way Bremer chose
to govern Iraq it is likely that Blackwater may still not have gotten as much power as it
did. Authors like Scahill claim that Blackwater was something of a Praetorian guard for
Bremer and the other occupation officials of Iraq. While such imperial titles are not
flattering, there is something to be said about the fact that Blackwater and companies like
it, and not the United States military protected most of the occupation officials. In fact,
many like Bremer openly admitted to seeing these private security details as far more safe
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for them than United States military personnel. Scahill claims it is due to shady business
dealings or some sort of outside relationship between these officials and the contracting
companies, but it is hard to prove that is the case. Certainly, these companies were willing
to do some political favors for their supporters but they also did prove to be effective at
their jobs even if that efficiency was hindered by the instability and bad press associated
with private security.114
Aside from just patronizing contracting companies, Bremer had a major role in
how contractors would operate in Iraq. Bremer’s role in Iraq was much like that of a
governor. Until power could be handed back to the Iraqi people he was to be one of the
sole figures of power. That position of power made Bremer one of the most important
people in Iraq and one of the most powerful people there as well. With that position
Bremer had the authority to do a great deal in Iraq and was expected to. The Bush
administration sent Bremer to Iraq with the purpose of bringing major change to the
nation of Iraq once the occupation was under way. Given that goal Bremer set out to
bring major changes to Iraq before that handover of power would eventually remove him.
One of Bremer’s first moves was to target all agencies and military organizations that had
been associated with Saddam. In doing that Bremer completely disbanded all military and
intelligence groups that had been in Iraq. He also completely dismantled the Ba'ath party,
putting all low-ranking members up to a review that would see if they could retain their
positions.115
That removal of those people from their positions was intended to give Iraq a
fresh start and freedom from the influences of Saddam. The actual effects of removing
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those people were almost the opposite of that intention. Removing those people from
power utterly crippled Iraqi civil operations. Without many of those Ba'ath party
personnel working on civil institutions Iraq nearly lost all bureaucratic functions. That
created a great deal of chaos and led to large sections of the Sunni population facing
unemployment which would bolster the later insurgency groups operating against the
United States occupation forces. These actions would see gaps in both coalition officials
and local Iraqi leaders in attempts to manage affairs of the country successfully after the
end of Saddam’s regime. Those two decisions effectively made sure that the chaos of the
occupation was already more of a problem than it could have been. As well Bremer
made the decision to delay handing over power to Iraq leaders after making those
decisions, an act that would give many in Iraq the impression that the United States and
its allies were not there to liberate the nation from Saddam. Bremer’s earliest actions
started to wear on the goodwill between the local populace and the coalition forces and
that was something that would be felt through efforts to stabilize Iraq.116
Many of those choices that left Iraqis unable to deal with the day to day managing
of their affairs meant that slack would likely be taken up by coalition officials. Those
choices were made quickly and as the full effect of them was being realized the coalition
forces were still attempting to figure out what exactly the end goal of their mission would
be. With the Iraqi government toppled it seemed that planners had overlooked what
exactly to follow through with. That chaos in planning, combined with the removal of so
many civil officials meant that coalition forces found themselves shouldered with the
burden of governing and managing even the day to day affairs of an entire nation. While
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the invasion force had been completely sufficient to deal with the Iraqi army, occupying
and governing an entire nation was not something that they had the numbers to deal with.
As more and more issues stretched manpower thin it became apparent that more people
would be needed to handle the many issues pressing the occupation forces.117
Bremer’s critics also hold that he made several mistakes in how he developed his
plans to try and stabilize Iraq. As he looked for Iraqi advisors to try and see what solution
may be the best course, Bremer sought out exiles, people who had been forced out of the
country under Saddam’s rule as a threat to his power. His attempts to try and rebuild
many of the government systems, Iraq proved to have not been well consulted and proved
to be deeply flawed, as they were put into practice. That lack of well-informed decisionmaking would become a theme of Bremer’s control in Iraq throughout the occupation.
While he went to great lengths to be consulted on issues he would often make a mistake
with whom he chose to deal with. He often ignored former Iraqi officials and locals in
favor of those exiles or people he thought aligned more with his political goals for Iraq.
Those efforts not only introduced flawed systems but the Iraqi populace perceived many
of the attempts as failures or insults. Many of them felt completely left out of the
decision-making process as only the selected advisors were allowed their input.118
The removal of those civil officials removed many of the important people that
Bremer could have drawn advice from. The chance to learn about past or even some
existing problems was lost. That would be one of the more chaotic mistakes as the
provisional government showed that it would have next to no tolerance for former
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Ba’athists. This, in retrospect, may have been a major issue for the occupation as the
assumption that it would be a short-term operation for the United States military proved
to be false. Combined with many of the early mistakes by Bremer in trying to build Iraq’s
justice system and other government entities it soon became clear that the coalition forces
were completely under prepared. The idea that they might be seen as liberators and their
presence would be welcomed failed as well. As it became apparent that several
insurgency movements were brewing in Iraq it was clear the stabilizing of the nation
would be much more dangerous than was previously thought. The early occupation was
much more of a whirlwind than anyone thought it would be but the decisions made by
Bremer and other occupation officials did not help the situation.119
The lack of reliable advisors was not just a problem on the Iraq side of planning.
Many officials back in Washington who were prepared and extremely experienced were
also passed over when it came to planning the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Some of
these officials would have been well suited to forming a working plan for the occupation
officials on how to proceed in Iraq. For some unexplained reason the Bush administration
chose to pass over these people in favor of other choices. Excluding those senior officials
from any part of the planning for how to proceed with Iraq could be another error in the
invasion and occupation. It is hard to say why this choice was made but the effects were
just as serious as ignoring many of the potential advisors who could have been drawn
from the Iraqi population. It seems plausible to say that the choice to leave senior
officials out of the decision-making process may have been part of that school of thought
championed by Rumsfeld that sought a major shakeup in the way the United States
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handled its military affairs. In calling for a constant drive to step away from Cold War
methods of problem solving it may have caused the administration to try look to newer
ideas and fresher minds on how to confront the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq.120
That choice to send many of the Iraqi officials away is one that is repeatedly
brought up by critics, as well as occupation officials' complete disconnect from the Iraqi
people. There certainly is something to these claims as the high hopes for Iraq quickly
saw it become one of the most dangerous places in the world, a place that would need
private security operators to keep occupation officials alive as the people who were
supposed to think highly of those officials plotted to kill them. That major disconnect
became even worse as the occupation officials set up the Green Zone and completely
walled themselves off from the Iraqi people. The problems of Bremer and his people
being selective on who they interacted with only became worse once there were literal
walls between them and the people who they were in effect governing. Once the Green
Zone was set up occupation officials spoke almost exclusively to other Americans. That
would not help smooth over the occupation as Bremer and others continued to not consult
with Iraqis on how to proceed. These choices made tensions swell, and extra security that
was needed to keep these occupation officials safe only added to the already vicious cycle
that saw contractors fill Iraq.121
The poor planning prior to the invasion was also a major factor in how the
occupation was carried out. While Bremer did not factor into that planning it affected the
situation he would be placed in charge of. The mindset that the occupation would be a
quick transitional period proved to be false rather rapidly. The steps taken to try and
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rebuild the country after that proved to not be the case only furthered the appearance that
no real plan had been put in place. Something that is usually forgotten is that men like
Bremer covered the planning for Iraq. While military officials are a major part of the
narrative they are serving alongside another large group of civilians who were attempting
to help rebuild Iraq. The struggle of those civilian officials to put together a working Iraq
government or even basic national systems shows how little planning had been done. The
idea that such an operation as removing Saddam Hussain from power and replacing him
with a more democratic government would be something that could be done quickly and
easily proved to be an issue.122
That information certainly makes the case that Bremer acted as best he could
given various circumstances. The plans laid out for Iraq were already simple at best and
the fact that the administration proved unwilling to listen to some of the minds who could
do a great deal to help it only made things worse. Bremer was put into a situation where
almost every decision he had planned on likely had little in the way of advice. His own
actions did make those decisions worse as he could have done plenty more to welcome
Iraqis into the decision-making process but did not. Still from the start the planning
stages on how post-invasion Iraq should be handled proved to have been as rocky as the
occupation. Rapid assumption quickly led to flawed plans which set decision makers like
Bremer up to only make more flawed plans and decisions. That lack of planning seems to
have set up for many of the issues that would lead to contractors to come spilling into
Iraq. After all, the plans that Iraq would be a simple mission called for relatively few
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troops to try and occupy Iraq, but as things descended into chaos it became clear that
would not be enough.123
That manpower issue would be one of the leading problems that would see private
contractors flood into Iraq. These were companies like Halliburton who handled
primarily security functions but also those like Blackwater. As the occupation forces
found themselves having to deal with more and more of the local governance issues more
of these contractors would be brought in. The simple problem arose that there were not
enough coalition forces to deal with every single problem. Thus, issues like defending
certain municipal buildings, running supply caravans, and protection of occupation
officials like Bremer would have to be passed onto private security. All of that occurred
as a background to the confusion on how long the mission in Iraq might even be. Some
forces indicated that a withdrawal might happen far earlier than it did. The amount of
confusion even among those carrying out the occupation could well have played into the
hiring of many of these companies. The fact it became a long-term problem may well
have never even been considered a problem. It a sense it became a rapid stop-gap solution
deployed against an ongoing and evolving problem.124
Aggravating these issues, Bremer failed to grasp many of the complexities of
Iraqi ethnic, religious, and regional identities. While the breakup of Yugoslavia was in
many ways caused by ethic and national identity issues, it did not suffer as much from
these issues as Iraq. In the Balkans those identity issues were limited in scope and the
problem was that civil war there focused on keeping Yugoslavia together as a nation
before many of the ethnic issues were accounted for. As such once it was clear that the
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Balkans were going to exist as several independent states much of the violence died down
as NATO could quickly suppress most of the ethnic violence led by the Serbs. Though it
is also important to note that the ethnic issues in the Balkans also had a geographic
component, which the issues in Iraq would not have.125
Meanwhile though, Iraqi identity problems were far more complex and became
clearer after the invasion was in motion. Local identities often usurp any idea of an
“Iraqi” identity and thus the idea of handling Iraq as a single unit became much more
problematic. The result there is that the comparison between the Balkans and Iraq broke
down. Unlike in the Balkans ethnic and identity problems in Iraq could not be quickly
suppressed nor was the country being redrawn considered a possibility. The idea that Iraq
could quickly be occupied and then withdrawn from with the help of contractors like the
Balkans seems to be a poor comparison. Not only are some of these identities locally
based some of them are religious or kinship based, which only further breaks down any
comparison between operations in the Balkans during the breakup of Yugoslavia. As that
comparison was likely one of Bremer’s only precedents to turn on for an occupation, as
Desert Storm had not had to deal with occupation, there was going to be a struggle. Iraq’s
identity politics and issues were already frustratingly complex and to make matters worse
the only unifying force in Iraq, the Ba’ath Party, was deconstructed by Bremer. Bremer
did not grasp these complexities and unfortunately the best comparison that planners had
to give Bremer was a poor one with the Balkans. Failure to come to terms with those
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identity politics and the fact Iraq was not going to be allowed to segment, as Yugoslavia
had done, mean that tensions were only going to rise. 126
The problem at the core was that the more issues that arose with the occupation
the more people the coalition would have to throw at those problems. Thus, there was a
massive surge of military personnel flooding into Iraq but also contractors. The rate of
growth for both groups being nearly equal as the ratio of normal troops to contractors,
reached one to one at the height of the occupation.127 It became obvious that escaping the
occupation of Iraq was not going to be as simple as was first thought, with more
manpower funneling into the country. The result: contractors became as major of a part of
that occupation force as the militaries they were serving alongside. They were tasked
with servicing or protecting large parts of the coalition throughout Iraq and did just that.
As the occupation had to slowly cover the entire country, contractors were going to be
brought along though their presence was most felt in areas that were central to the
occupation forces governing Iraq. Throughout all that Bremer was at the center trying to
manage the various affairs of the occupation and trying to develop Iraq into something
completely different than it had been prior to the invasion.128
As has been seen with previous major decision makers Bremer shows that once
again that there are several factors feeding into how Blackwater rose so massively. On his
side, though there are also the questions of how they could become such a reckless force
in the occupation. The violence that followed these security contractors became possibly
the longest legacy of their part in the occupation. It seemed that anywhere specifically
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Blackwater contractors went there was trouble with the occupation, including the deaths
of some of their employees in Fallujah which seemed to be retaliation for actions taken
by the occupation forces prior to those killings. It raises the question if Bremer did
anything to make these violent events more likely to occur or could have done anything
to stop them. As it stands Bremer must have been aware of some of these more violent
events, though by the time the worst of them would happen he would be out of power as
the Iraqis reclaimed government for themselves.129
Largely, it is Bremer’s issuing of Order 17 that is considered to have made
contractors like those from Blackwater think themselves above the law. The Order stated
that the new incoming Iraqi government could not take legal action against contractors
within their country. Critics like Scahill claim that this is a clear sign that these men got
far better treatment than they would ever deserve. His stance was that no matter what
these men were accused of doing little to nothing was done about it under Bremer or after
him. Scahill points out that the logic behind the Order was supposed to be that the United
States would deal with whatever crimes these people committed. Scahill counters that
that was never actually the case.130 There does appear to be something to this as until
2014 none of these contractors ever served prison time for what they did in Iraq, with a
trial for those men being stuck in the works for several years before it ever got off the
ground. Even then, it was still the United States that did arrest and convict these people,
not the Iraqi government. There are plenty of other violent incidents that Blackwater
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contractors and even other companies’ employees are tied to. Those events have never
spawned trials and the current convictions stand as the only ones of their kind. 131
Order 17 does not seem to have helped Bremer’s policies or their image. The
order at face value was designed to protect American citizens from being tried and
convicted in a country that many occupation officials could not carry out the justice. In
practice, it appears to have played out like an imperialistic policy calling back to the
immunities enjoyed by Europeans in China. The fact it allowed these contractors to
ignore Iraqi law has been pointed out by critics, as something, many of these people may
have viewed as a free pass. Those critics may well have been justified, as violence by
contractors against Iraqis remained a near constant issue even after Bremer had left Iraq.
Clearly, this was not the intent of the Order but it did in fact make the employees of
companies like Blackwater think they could act as they pleased, with efforts to cover their
trials and keep them out of trouble only serving to prove them right.132
The legacy of Bremer is one that shows how the planning of the Iraq War was
deeply flawed. The rush to action in hopes the people of Iraq would welcome a
democratic government, with open arms, proved to be a misstep. Moreover, Bremer did
nothing to help the situation as he only developed more problems for Iraq by taking such
an adamant stance that no Ba’athists could be allowed to keep doing their jobs. This left a
large swath of the country unemployed and made sure occupation and military officials
had no locals to learn from. His choices and the decisions that led to the post-war plans
being so hastily done paved the way for Iraq to become a quagmire. With all the other
various trends and developments in privatization that had already occurred the door was
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more than open to someone like Prince, who was poised to take advantage of all those
elements. The surge of contractors into Iraq and their behavior in the country would only
further serve to destabilize the region.
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Chapter 4
In both of its missions in the Middle East the United States has found itself
lacking in manpower to keep up its occupations. There are many non-combat officials on
the ground that need to be protected and compounds that need protection. As demands
grew on the needs and goals of American troops, the lack of manpower was exacerbated.
There were only so many marines and soldiers to do an ever-growing number of tasks.
Not to mention in the early parts of the occupation the military found itself in need of
more logistical help. Historically, nations facing the problem of manpower shortage have
always filled those gaps with private individuals. When the British could not fully outfit
an army to bring against the Americans in the Revolutionary War, they hired out the men
of Hesse-Cassel. In a situation, much like what the United States would be facing in Iraq
the British found themselves short on men to carry out a massive military operation.
Thus, they sought out the Hessians, in doing so they brought private individuals into the
conflict who they paid more than their own soldiers. The British would encounter similar
problems from their mercenaries that the United States would later deal with as well. The
opposition saw the use of such troops as offensive as did many in the British Isles. As
well the Hessians only worsened both of those situations as they developed a reputation
for being looters. Thus, the British mission in attempting to put down the American
Revolution suffered as Hessians soured goodwill between the British and loyal
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colonists.133
America, under similar pressures did much the same thing under the guise of
private contractors. These companies became central to the American missions in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, and their use became problematic to the American government.
Uncontrolled and unrestricted contractors caused such ill will with the Iraqi government
and locals that Blackwater, the largest of them, was banned from operating within its
borders. As such, the argument has been made that these companies’ men on the ground
served to destroy goodwill between the American and Iraqi governments, and made the
mission to stabilize Iraq an even more difficult and costly struggle. Much like the British
found out during the Revolution, private sector solution to a man power problem could
make a mission objective even more difficult to handle militarily.
As the door to privatization opened it made many business-minded people
become aware of other problems in the military that could be solved for a profit. One of
these was training facilities, namely those for the Navy. Often the Navy, even the SEALs,
would have to borrow ranges from the Army. Given the advanced training required by
SEALs and other special forces these ranges were often considered to be lacking. Two
such critics were Erik Prince, the man who would later found Blackwater, and one of his
instructors from the SEALs, Al Clark. The two of them decided that a private company
could easily set up the complex facilities it would take to do advanced training for law
enforcement and military personnel. Clark had the idea far before meeting Prince due to
his time on military ranges and seeing a great deal of what they lacked but never had the
resources to do so. Prince, the son of a wealthy business owner, was not as limited in that
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regard.134 It is also important to point out that Prince had a good business sense on where
to place Blackwater. He chose to base Blackwater in North Carolina on part of the Dismal
Swamp. It was a cheap land purchase that would also put Blackwater in the back yard of
Washington as well as several military bases. That placement made the company
extremely appealing not just to the military, but also many of the federal agencies in
D.C.135
The development of the security division of Blackwater is bound with the story of
the 9/11 attacks. In the chaos that came after, many business ventures started looking for
ways that could help the government in whatever actions would come next. Prince was
certainly no exception to that. In the days following the attacks Prince attempted to join
on with the CIA and to take part in any ongoing investigations. While denied on both
accounts Prince’s willingness to take part in the government’s efforts was certainly noted.
Prince’s contacts within the CIA started informing him on all the problems these
campaigns might be facing; that knowledge as well as Prince’s previous work for many
government agencies played into his favor. The initial invasion of Iraq had little in the
way of opportunity for Blackwater. It was when American Special Forces in Afghanistan
started to make headway in toppling the Taliban it became apparent there may be
something to gain.136 Given Prince’s connections to the CIA and other government
agencies he was quickly able to hear about the manpower problems there. Prince quickly
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offered the solution that private security would likely be the quickest solution to the
problem and offered up a low bid for the contract.137
That contract was the start of private security contracting in the Middle East.
Blackwater’s defense of CIA operations in Afghanistan soon led to them ferreting out
other problems that plagued the American mission in the Middle East. When Iraq came
under full American occupation after the ousting of Saddam Hussein, it became clear
long term logistics were going to be problematic. That problem was one Prince was more
than willing to deal with. Over time Blackwater positioned itself with a fleet of cargo
aircraft to become a logistical arm of the military. The helicopters run by Blackwater
alone became a major part of transporting politicians and cargo. As the company began
to become more and more entangled with American efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
it became even bigger.138
The operations being carried out by Blackwater became monetarily impressive.
Before the company was banned from working in Iraq, at its height the company
controlled around one billion dollars in government contracts. This made it not only the
first of these private security companies to be hired on by the American government but
one of the largest. The cost of those contracts in the end meant that a great deal of every
tax dollar being spent on military spending by the U.S government was going to private
contractors.139 It was a lucrative business and as such Blackwater did not remain the only
company in the field for long. Though they remained the largest, that one billion reflected
not just their operators on the ground but the sheer amount of logistics they were dealing
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with for the American military, Blackwater'. They were on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan shuttling around American officials. In Iraq, these were men like Paul
Bremer and John McCain who both openly preferred them to American troops for
security. The attention they gained from escorting these people only increased the
attention on these private contractors and served to get their companies out there. 140
Once these groups were that well established they reached a one to one ratio with
American ground troops in Iraq. That statistic in the wake of this massive rise of private
contracting companies reflected a huge increase from what that number once was. In
Desert Storm the ratio between private contractors and American troops was one to sixtyfive. That massive increase meant that these men would have as much of an interaction
with the Iraqi population as the American troops did. That is certainly the case, as these
men interacted with the people of Iraq and shaped relations with them through their
actions. Everything about their behavior was just as important as those of American
troops and this was compounded by the fact that the American government had little say
in their behavior. The policies on oversight for these private companies abroad were
certainly problematic. There simply weren’t provisions for PMCs and often the matter of
employees that were an issue was largely left up to the company. Meaning, most of the
time anyone who did something they weren’t supposed to, no matter if it was a crime or
not, often just got sent home.141
The route that was taken that allowed for such operational freedom on the part of
contractors only served to increase tensions. There is the argument that they caused
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tension even when they were doing their job correctly. Now they did their job correctly
often, as under their watch many of the most important officials in Iraq survived. This
includes a list of extremely high level politicians who are more associated with politics
stateside than the occupation. In that regard they certainly had successes, as political
deaths on their watch were non-existent. Often though, the cost of this was a trail of Iraqi
bodies and the fear of the populace. Case in point: late in Blackwater’s time in Iraq,
traffic officers could see their vehicles coming and would stop traffic at roundabouts,
knowing the contractors would be coming through the wrong way. Regardless, the
tension that they caused makes it clear that they left a hostile impression. Their ill
behavior, openly expected by Iraqi people, and their traffic violations are the least of the
horror stories that came out of Iraq.142
The many stories that involved Blackwater in Iraq saw them involved in many of
the large events of the military campaign there. The company even found itself swept up
in the events of Fallujah. Blackwater operators played a major role in what would
become the second battle for that city. That is, the story of that second conflict for
Fallujah was the death of four Blackwater contractors. The ambush that killed these men
became an event that Blackwater hotly contested for some time. They claimed corruption
within the Iraqi police of Fallujah had led to the attack. These men were killed in a
horrible fashion while leading a caravan of goods back to an American military camp.
Their deaths are also largely considered to be the start of the major uprising in the city
that would have to be put down by the American military. Those deaths also represent the
first media reaction at home to contractors. While the stories following these men’s
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deaths were not followed up with any investigation into private contracting, the media
became aware.143
After Fallujah, there were of course more jobs for Blackwater, they kept up the
usual political convoys, though none of those would compare to the defensive action in
Najaf. The base was an important compound to the interim coalition government of Iraq.
The extremely mixed group known as the CPA, which was headed up by Paul Bremer,
handled Iraq’s affairs until, the full handover, could be done by the Americans. This area
had already been a hotbed of militia activity as soon as the Americans were on the
ground. The Shi'a majority there was roused into activity by a zealous young cleric. A
crack down by Bremer saw one of the chief advisors to this cleric arrested for supposed
involvement in a crime. This incensed him and caused him to attempt to besiege the CPA
compound in Najaf. Once again showing Bremer’s lack of forethought on the many
identity issues at work in Iraq.144
Regardless of how the city itself came to be overwhelmed, soon the militia was
bearing down on the compound, which was undermanned according to nearly all sources.
Najaf had no American combat troops, just some communication technicians in the area
who were helping to rebuild infrastructure damaged in the invasion. There were also a
handful of troops from other nations, like Ecuador, though the primary staffing of armed
guards on the base were just a few Blackwater contractors. That force barely broke into
the double digits was unarguably surrounded by a group, which was well over two
hundred in size, threatened to overrun the compound at any minute. This would certainly
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not be a comfortable position for any person to find themselves in but these are the parts
of the story that are the least up for interpretation by authors and readers.145
What came next at Najaf was the chaos of battle. The handful of defenders
decided to hold the compound as the American diplomat there decided that handing over
the CPA compound and the city would be a failing on his part. The handful of Blackwater
operators, troops from El Salvador, a United States Marine, and National Guardsmen
were left to that task. Prince does make his employees the heroes of the siege, as they
appear to have taken charge of the situation when it deteriorated. Largely this is
confirmed by more sources and will present an issue later on. The story of this in Prince’s
account unfolds like an action movie from there, with his employees leading the
defenders to hold the compound despite what in reality where overwhelming odds. More
than a few of the men who ended up on the roof of the CPA compound defending it were
shot. The events that unfolded saw a nearby hospital blown up by the defenders, and
thousands of rounds of ammunition spent. The saving grace of the defenders were the
small helicopters that Blackwater had several hundred of in Iraq. Those helicopters
allowed for additional ammunition to be dropped off to the defenders, a vital part of the
defense. Importantly, Prince uses this story as one of the major successes of Blackwater.
The entire chapter he spends discussing it spelled out how exactly they were vital to the
defense of the compound. He also highlights those successes in ways that also show
shortcomings in American military planning, shortcomings that could be made up with by
Blackwater after all.146
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Scahill, on the other hand, takes several different messages from this same story.
In his account it is important many of the major details and players are the same but he
does not take the same moral away from the story. Firstly, he points far more blame at the
occupational government and Bremer for inciting the violence in the first place. He holds
that their moves against the Shi’a forces at work in the city only served to make them
more aggressive. Shutting down their cleric’s newspaper and leading raids against his
followers and more overt actions only bolstered his points, as it appeared to be proving
all the things he was saying about the occupation right. All of this was built on an already
rocky situation; American forces were gearing up to move on Fallujah for a second time
after the city had been lost just days before the current situation began. From the get go
Scahill is giving readers a much more tense situation, even harking back to the fact that
Blackwater operators had been killed in the opening exchange in Fallujah. In all of this he
put far more blame on the occupation efforts, much of which he holds allowed
Blackwater to be there in the first place. That seems to be on point as given Bremer’s
track record at understanding the repercussions of dealing with Iraq’s this appears to be
another of those mistakes.147
Scahill is quick to point out that although Blackwater led the defense, American
forces did eventually aid in the defense and there are no paper records on how the attack
started. The exact death toll is also a complete mystery in this regard. Some sources put it
at twenty to thirty of the attackers dead but some of the men on the roof claim it must
have been hundreds. Scahill also points out how quickly Blackwater responded to this to
the public at home. The Vice President of the company came out to the media, as Prince

147

Scahill, Blackwater, 180-185.

76

at this point rarely spoke to the media, and explained that it had not been a battle.
Blackwater did not fight battles; they instead carried out security actions. Such
explanations of the blurry line that private contractors occupy became a repetitive feature
of their discussions with the public at home. Which of course shows that there were still
serious efforts to keep contractors out of the news and out of the public view, and if they
had to enter those circles it was done cautiously. Two other major issues come in
Scahill’s account as well: the effect this defense had on the occupation, and the fact that
Blackwater led the defense that day.148
The first of those had some obvious effects. The pushing off of the mob made
matters in Najaf much worse. Many Iraqis who had nothing to do with the attack now
remember it as a massacre, according to Scahill. There is some reasoning for this as
before the shooting was done there were clerics among the dead in the crowd. The cleric
originally in charge of the attack went on to call on his followers for an all-out uprising
against the occupation. The entire time saw him growing more and more influential in
that unstable period after the fall of Saddam’s regime. At least eight cities saw uprisings
related to this event, even one of the Shi’a slums of Baghdad. American forces on the
ground there had to move in and deal with them, which of course only worsened tensions
in the area as forces swept through. These tensions did not improve, as Bremer’s next
move was to declare Muqata Al-Sadr, the cleric behind the attacks and uprisings, an
outlaw. That choice only further proved every complaint Al-Sadr made about occupation
forces look true. Though, there is the argument at that stage there may be little else to do
in the face of someone becoming such a destabilizing presence. Regardless, it unified
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opposition to occupation forces for a short time in the aftermath.149 It is also important to
note that many people who look at this from an international law stand point take offense
to the fact that Blackwater contractors ordered American troops to fire. Schaill points this
out aggressively, that these people are for all purposes employees of the American
government and shouldn’t have been giving orders on that rooftop. Certainly, there is
something to be said about that argument. It likely should not be these people
commanding American troops. Several critics of contracting came out about this issue as
well as Najaf. Najaf did get some attention from the media and those critics but was
largely over shadowed by the retaking of Fallujah back in the United States.150
With that said, it also seems important to note that Prince addresses next to none
of this in his account of Najaf. He does not even go into the aftermath of the event or try
to make any connection that the upheaval in Iraq was connected in anyway. Prince does
defend the fact that his men where issuing orders on that rooftop but that is only because
Prince was clashing with critics in the military. Several military officials, spearheaded by
Lieutenant General Sanchez, criticized the event or claimed it didn’t happen as the men
on the ground claimed it did. That is Prince’s primary focus: lashing out at these people
and even people he felt like did not give Blackwater its due credit. Prince’s defense
becomes a little one-sided to just people who were incorrect in claiming the attack was
less severe than his men claimed or not giving them enough credit. Given the sheer scale
that Scahill lays out of events that followed this one, it seems lacking to just pass over
that. This speaks volumes about the goals of Prince’s narrative.151
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Regardless, Najaf is largely looked at as one of the big successes for Blackwater
in Iraq. Often times it is referred to by their defenders for the good they can do. Just like
in Prince’s telling often times the negatives that go with it are left out or overlooked.
Though in continuing the argument that they increased tensions in Iraq, there are many
more incidents that come up that are less favorable for them. These incidents range from
the obscure sightings only reported on by Iraqi’s themselves to well documented losses of
life, both of which exist in great numbers and had unfavorable effects on public opinion
in Iraq. It came to the point that some of the behaviors of Blackwater itself started to gain
the ire of the people they were protecting. Matt Degn, one of these people came to call
working with them when trying to work out deals with Iraqi militias said this: “It’s like
one step forward, eight steps backward.” That quote comes despite Degn himself
attesting to the fact these people were willing to do whatever it took to keep him safe,
though that in itself was part of the problem. 152
As evidence of attacks carried out by Blackwater surfaced, many were called
rumors but others were found popping up in Iraqi police reports and in complaints of
their new established Intelligence Directorate. Iraqi police reports produced evidence of
several shootings that occurred involving Blackwater employees firing on Iraqi’s that
approached them. One of the worst of these incidents was a group of Blackwater snipers
gunning down guards for the Iraqi Media Network. Attempts by the Iraqi army to
investigate the shooting were met by taunts from the contractors who ended up simply
driving away from the scene. Even worse, the shooting was carried out from the roof of
the new Justice Ministry of Iraq. The Media Network reported on the shooting and
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investigated further and said that this had been an attack by Blackwater contractors.
Attempts to try and bring about a lawsuit on behalf of the victims ended up defeated once
an Iraqi judge simply stated that his hands were bound by, legal authority of Order 17,
which still stood.153
The constant defeat of Iraqi Justice in these cases is what frustrated the
Intelligence Directorate more. The organization had hoped its close ties would lend them
credibility in the eyes of the American occupation officials but on matters such as these
violent events they were snubbed repeatedly. Attempts to try and gain some justice on
these matters were blocked repeatedly as Order 17 was thrown into their faces again and
again. It is easy to imagine how frustrating this must be. These are people who were
completely willing to work with the United States on this occupation and had in some
cases helped to over throw Saddam. It is no stretch to say they were going to be upset
when any attempt to carry out justice against people attacking them was stopped. Only
making matters worse is that these were contractors with the American occupation, which
does not paint a good image. Even more upsetting is that the Directorate was supposedly
in charge of the management of the contracting companies within Iraq. It is hard to
imagine something more insulting, supposedly being in charge of a group of people who
cannot be punished. The restraints placed on these new Iraqi institutions here clearly just
show more sources of tension.154
Furthering this is the fact that those restraints were supposed to be because
Americans would deal with any unjust dealing inflicted by contractors. That was the
theory at least but in the wake of many of these violent attacks this did not seem to be the
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practice. After many of these attacks, attempts by Iraqi agencies to get cooperation out of
the American officials on the ground were not easy. Investigations by the State
Department often amounted to simply asking the contractors themselves what had
occurred. Often they would not even speak to Iraqi’s about the event and take the
contractors’ stories and shut the case. In the case of the Media Network shooting no
American official ever returned to the scene to investigate. American handling of any
element of these events lent no credence to the mission in Iraq. Some Iraqi officials even
reported that events like this certainly only made them more enemies. American officials
also responded that these events only gave insurgents more things to exploit for their own
gains with the population.155
More importantly were the attempts by American officials to keep these attacks
from the media back home. Iraqi opinions were important to keeping the occupation
running smoothly but opinion at home also carried weight. As such it seems there were
some efforts made to keep non-Iraqis from reporting on these events. That does appear to
have been a success as most major media outlets were silent on this matter until after the
most famous of the Blackwater shootings, Nisoor Square. Otherwise they only appear to
have popped up in articles concerning their actions at home or just mentions of their
existence on the world stage. The media is surprisingly sparse until about 2007 when that
scandal broke. Some mentions of what went on are out there but they are not the majority
of what would be written on the company. After that it appears that the flood gates could
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no longer be held shut and the greatest bulk of this came to light along with that
shooting.156
The shooting at Nisoor Square served as the tipping point for Blackwater in Iraq
as well as one of the most damaging instances of the relation with Iraq. The shooting,
often dubbed “Iraq’s Bloody Sunday” resulted when four Blackwater guards opened fire
into a traffic circle in Iraq. The guards claimed they were acting to defend the convoy
they were a part of but there is little evidence that they were under any amount of fire.
The best evidence is that a car bomb went off several blocks away about twenty minutes
prior to the shooting. The official American embassy report holds to the Blackwater story
that there had in fact been a fire fight and that the shooting that followed was a result of
that. What followed was much closer to the wholesale slaughter of 14 Iraqis. Of course
the Iraqi people, and the newly built Iraqi government, met this with an instant outcry.
This caused the newly formed government to start trying to push for ways to finally bring
justice against these contractors.157
Scahill is quick to point out that this was certainly no easy road for the Iraqi
government as until American and other outside media sources started picking up on the
story it was resisted. There were attempts to keep the story out of the media, some even
both those within the Iraqi government who were hoping it would just die down. Largely,
the main attempt being to handle it as the previous attacks had been handled: publishing
the Blackwater story as the official telling for the American embassy. The story proved to
be too much to keep hidden though, and Iraqi reporting proved to be far too aggressive
for even Western media to not notice. He also holds it was not just the media that saw
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attempts to keep some of these events from the public. He posits that some within the
government went so far as to order Blackwater to not open any details on its contract
until after the oversight hearing on Capitol Hill that resulted from this event. Once again
the momentum behind Nisoor seemed to be too much to keep under wraps. Eventually
the story broke despite clear attempts to reign it in.158
The Western media exploded because of this attack. While there had been minor
mentions of Blackwater and contractors prior to Nisoor, it did not to compare. In the
wake of the scandal surfacing several news media outlets came out in full opposition to
the attacks but the fact Blackwater existed at all. It seems much of that veiled and subtle
language that Rumsfeld and Cheney used in their promotion of contracting had been
necessary. Once Blackwater was out in the open and the media made aware of their
practices in Iraq pressure built for something to be done about it. That pressure is largely
what would cause all the following events, the push to put the contractors, who carried
the attack out on trial, Blackwater losing its contracts, all of it. The attempts to keep
contractors out of the media makes perfect sense when seeing exactly what happens when
they did get in the news. While it took some time for the offenders to see jail time the
media and public backlash did the damage that would bring an end to Blackwater’s
height. Public opinion and the attacks by the media even brought the company down
despite a renewed contract as will be shown. 159
Prince for his answer to this incident largely tries to follow the official report
given by his men, that this was a chaotic attack on the convoy they were leading.
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Compared to the other accounts surrounding the event it does not hold up well. The tale
of one car after another speeding toward the convoy does not hold up when it is made
clear that Iraqi civilians were driving those cars. It stands out that Prince also chose to
spend a great deal describing rules of engagement, spelling out the chain of events a
Blackwater operator would have to go through before firing, directly after telling his
version of Nisoor. The attempt to showcase this event as completely legal becomes
apparent but nonetheless it does not hold up well in the face of opposition when
compared to the other accounts. There is also barely any attempt to make any sort of
reference to the victims, only a few mentioned by name even in Prince’s telling.160
The claims of this story are also the primary defense given by Prince and
Blackwater personnel to Congress. The Committee on Oversight that was produced in the
aftermath of Nisoor saw Prince completely retell this story. Prince began actively using it
as the public defense, that his men had in fact done nothing wrong. The Committee
questioned Prince strongly on both Nisoor and other violent occurrences. Prince
attempted to use the same defense each time, that Blackwater had done no wrong. To
many members on the Committee though, it soon became clear that defense was not
enough. Several of them openly questioned the value of the services being provided by
Blackwater and companies like it. Many seemed convinced that employing these private
companies had done more harm to their mission in Iraq than good. While many Iraqis did
not feel that way, it seems to be some consolation that the tide was turning in the
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government itself.161 It is important to note that not all support had failed as House
republicans moved to try and adjourn the session early the day of the committee to keep it
from happening.162
Regardless of the claims made by Blackwater about its people being on the right
side of the law, events turned against them. As the investigation set into motion
Blackwater’s convoys were put on halt in Iraq. They had become so tangled into
American political dealings in the country that halt put all political movement out of the
Green Zone on standby. The outcry against the company proved to grant some political
power to the Iraqi government on the matter this time. The pressure the backlash from the
shooting caused allowed them to levy enough pressure to get some control over the
contractors in the company. Finally, they would be allowed to decide which companies
could do business inside of the Iraq border. Once this power was handed over Blackwater
was of course banned from operating inside the borders of Iraq and as such lost their
American contract to the rival company Triple Canopy. Importantly, this not only
removed Blackwater but also put an end to Order 17.163
Certainly, the American government backing down on that order was an attempt
to create some good will with the Iraqi government. It is safe to say that many in the Iraqi
government likely viewed defeated Order 17 as a major victory. After all, this was a
problem that had been causing uproar among the Iraqi population since the occupation
started. Now that Iraq had some power over the contractors, who could operate within her

161

United States, Blackwater USA hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, October 2, 2007. Washington: U.S.
G.P.O. http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS108535, 1-9.
162
Scahill, Blackwater, 1-2.
163
“Iraq to end contractor immunity” BBC News, October 30, 2007.

85

borders, was a step in the right direction but there is evidence the damage to AmericanIraqi relations was done. The slow movement on the part of the American officials in the
country in dealing with the events of Nisoor Square was not taken well by Iraqi officials.
The events following the shooting were not pleasing to the government of Iraq as well.
The attempts to secure justice were blocked as the contractors were moved out of the
country. American officials adopted the story supported by the contractors without talking
to any of the Iraqi witnesses. Even more upsetting to Iraqis was, in the wake of this
shooting, Blackwater’s contracts with the American government were initially renewed
before being cancelled. That renewal was followed by several positive comments coming
from American officials as well. While the shooting was not followed by uprisings like
Najaf, it turned tensions up and strained relations between the two countries. Most of this
is certainly insulting to a government to say the least.164
Those tensions were not lifted when the American government attempted to curb
those tensions. Attempts were made to bring these men to trial in the United Stated back
at home. While not the best answer it may have been the simplest and best way to show
some sort of solidarity. The problem was that the first attempt to bring this trial to court
was thrown out by an American judge. That result for the first attempt at a trial only
worsened the tensions surrounding Nisoor. The evidence, according to the judge, was
inadmissible under the circumstances. That statement was made despite Iraqi eyewitnesses and a member of the Blackwater team being willing to testify against his
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colleagues. Even as the United States government tried to repair the damage done, the
outcome in fact made things worse once again.165
The Iraqi government did show its displeasure with that event quite clearly
though. While attempts to appeal the decision to throw out the case were in order, Iraq
moved to throw out all remaining members of Blackwater. While the company had been
banned from operating it had changed names and many of its former employees had
remained in the country either working for different companies or staying on through
Blackwater’s rebranding attempt after Nisoor Square had turned against them. Iraq
wanted these people gone and as such had 250 current and former members of the
company expelled from her borders. Obliviously, the Iraqi government was in no mood to
sit around and wait for the American legal machine to work out the appeals against the
men who committed the shootings at Nisoor. Despite promises from Vice President Joe
Biden that something would be done, clearly that was not enough. Then again punishing
a handful of men from a company that had done so much wrong does come off weak.
Still, the American government and not any legal organization was pushing for this case
to be taken back to trial, likely to save relations with Iraq as Anti-American sentiment
remained high in the wake of this scandal.166
As those relations remained strained, public opinion at home shifted more and
more against these contractors. Bills appeared in both the house and the Senate that called
for the elimination of contractors from the use of American military planning. This
echoes back to some of the comments in the committee on oversight as the idea of private
contracting was openly questioned. These movements gathered against Blackwater,
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picking up speed as other events came to light, such as the fact the company had been
investigated for illegally transporting weapons across international borders. Members of
Blackwater faced charges for that on more than one occasion. Many of the other
shootings that were only now being revealed were mentioned in these bills that were
aiming to entirely dismantle the empires built by these companies. Support for them was
clearly draining in the face of this scandal as many in the government saw these
contractors as unworthy of the billions they had received in funding.167
That eroding support was met with more pressure to produce a second trial,
coming from both within the American government and within Iraq itself. Several Iraqi
officials openly called for a new trial to be put together. Their demands were not that
these people were not tried in Iraq, but more a demand that they face justice at all. They
even openly claimed they would do whatever they could to see these men prosecuted for
their actions. Some showed absolute defeat with American justice as they saw these
people defended yet again in the face of what in the minds of most Iraqis was
overwhelming evidence. To many of them the evidence levied against these men would
have been enough to get Iraqis arrested by American occupation forces. As the battle for
the second trial went on Iraqi anger and discontent once again became an issue. American
military officials worried that the acquittal could mean more uprisings across the country.
While that did not happen, Iraqi discontent with American justice and operations was
clear.168
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As mentioned previously, Joe Biden came out against the decision of the judge
that ended the first trial. While it was not enough to repair relations, it proved that the
Obama administration was looking at this as a major issue. Certainly, the administration
was more than willing to commit resources to this issue as they moved to start the appeal
process themselves. There were clearly elements attempting to smooth over relations in
this move. The objective of trying to get this appeal going was to prove that the American
government could and would punish anyone who had done wrong to the Iraqi people.
Given that the Iraqi people had the exact opposite proved true to them more than once,
proving that justice would be carried out was now of vital importance in trying to keep
those relations in order. It proved one way or another that the administration was going to
pursue the trial to improve relations with Iraq. That commitment would prove to be
important, as it was a long task to get the second trial in motion after the appeal was
successful.169
After a great deal of struggle the appeal was finally put together and the second
trial was finally put back on track. It had taken a great deal of effort by the American
government itself to put this trial in motion and clearly some compromises were made.
One of the contractors was completely cleared of the second trial; the charges dropped
against him were never brought back up. The man who had been willing to make a plea
deal remained in cooperation with the prosecution. It is also important to note that three
of the men were being charged with manslaughter while one was being charged with first
degree murder, as he had fired the first shot. Importantly, the trial was being treated as a
self-defense case, the contractors and their lawyers having to prove that there had been
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cause for lethal force. The prosecution made itself known that they were there to prove
once and for all that these contractors were not above the law. This was likely an outreach
to the watching Iraqi people and government, as the American government even went to
the effort of having the surviving victims of Nisoor and the families of those killed
transported to the trial.170
It seemed like the trial was turned into an important foreign policy event for the
American government. If these men walked again, or worse yet the case was thrown out
again, it could destroy Iraqi faith in the American system. As such the prosecution clearly
took this case as a dire matter. They did not make some of the earlier mistakes made
when the shooting first broke into American circles. They actively used the eye witness
accounts of the attacks and combined that with aerial photos of the area and pictures of
the crime scene to make for a strong case. The defense for their part did a great deal to try
and get the second trial thrown out, though their attempts to do so this time were far less
successful. The compromise of leaving the fifth shooter out of the trial had weakened that
point. That would not stop them from making jabs where they could in attempting to
derail the proceedings. They went to such lengths that would often see them accusing the
government of having evidence left out of the trial. The biggest of these claims was the
rage over a single picture of eight empty bullet casings being left out. The defense
claimed it was evidence of incoming fire.171
Ultimately, these attempts by the defense did not derail that trial as they thought
they would. The prosecution proved to just have too weighty of a case built against the
men on trial and certainly physical evidence was in no short supply, and the same could
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be said of witnesses. As it became clear that a guilty verdict would be coming down in
the face of such evidence the battle became over sentencing. The defense tried to find
various ways to prove that these men did not deserve anything lengthy and perhaps the
minimum sentencing should be waived. It was clear from the outset that was not going to
be an option. Anything less than the minimum would be insulting to the Iraqis and with
good reason, as they were still watching this trial closely. The prosecution did demand
however, much longer than the minimum sentences as the manslaughter and firearm
charges these men were facing both carried a thirty-year minimum. In the end the Judge
opted to avoid both routes and did opt for the minimum sentencing on all charges.172 That
is despite efforts by the defense to try and derail the sentencing.
Their attempts to delay were promptly shut down by the judge on all fronts
though, despite claims by the defense that the entire trial should have been thrown out.
The law that allowed these men to the prosecuted in the States only applied to
Department of Defense of contractors, not State Department men like these were. Those
attempts along with several others trying to use legal loopholes to slow down sentencing
were all equally silenced. It was clear the Justice Department was not going to allow
another round of the first trial to happen as that could lead to another mess on their hands.
That said he would hear nothing of delaying the sentencing though, the judge among a
great many other people was ready to end the trial. Any other attempt to try and change
the result of the trail would have to be done through appeals. The judge held most of the
matters the defense had brought up could be handled more smoothly in appeals anyway.
The prosecution, which was led by United States Justice Department attorneys, made it
172

Eric Tucker, “Former Guards to get lengthy prison sentences for Iraq shootings,” Charlotte Observer,
April 12, 2015.

91

apparent that they thought a much longer sentence was called for but would defer to the
judgment of the court.173
The prosecution being state employed certainly sends the message that the
government truly intended to break the concept that these men were above the law. This
lined up with goals clearly laid out by the administration when they laid out the desire to
pursue an appeal through Joe Biden. Following through with the conviction must have
been an important step in regaining some good will with Iraq. They were certainly not
upset with the result as the men finally received some sort of punishment, something the
Iraqis had been demanding for years and even before Nisoor happened. The carrying out
of this case also did something even more important, something the defense had more
than likely been trying to prevent. The successful case against these contractors saw to it
that precedence was set. These people could now be taken home and charged for the
crimes that they committed even in the so called “fog of war” which could be an
upsetting thing for those contractors still abroad. The victory here was certainly no small
matter for the people of Iraq or for the future of American military efforts. After all, if
these men are going to continue playing a role in American objectives abroad, something
must keep them in check.174
The fact this was at an end was likely an important step for many Iraqis, who had
been so upset with events at Nisoor they refused monetary compensation. The ill will left
behind by this event saw Iraqis call for these men’s deaths as punishment for their crimes,
though importantly they were calling for a death sentence not a murder. Still, for a long
time a lot of these issues went unaddressed as Iraqis had high hopes the first time these
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men were brought up on charges. The cries for something to be done about what had
become a rampant problem in the occupation had finally been answered. To many this
was not just the justice for Nisoor Square, some Iraqis saw this as the United States
finally admitting its people were not the masters of Iraq. This was a concern that many
had felt in the wake of these acts of violence, as it seemed that these men could treat
Iraqis as they pleased. In many ways, the successful conviction of these men provided
answers and solace to those less than ideal questions. This showed, in part at least, that
America could and would act as Iraqi’s ally and not its master. Though it is impossible to
tell if the full extent of the damage that was done can be healed, simply by putting these
men away, it is a step in the right direction. In action and practice, it seems to no longer
be the course that the United States will take on these matters for the time being.175
It is important to point out though that security contractors are far from a thing of
the past currently. Not even Blackwater vanished in its entirety. After all Iraq, had
expelled the remaining former employees of the company long after the fallout of Nisoor
Square had ended their contract. Those bans and removals survived the company’s
several name changes in the wake of their failing reputation.176 The company changed
names and hands several times with the security division now going by the name
Paravant. That company continued to operate in Afghanistan and other American interests
in the Middle East. The ban by the Iraqi government saw to the fact that they would not
be welcome again, that move to banish them from the country proved effective. Certainly,
when the American government was willing to back it up. Interestingly, these former
Blackwater employees remain an issue abroad as they cause incidents in Afghanistan as
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well. Some of these incidents mirror those in Iraq but also saw contractors injuring each
other with firearms while drunk. Importantly, in looking at these events again the
American government is much sterner with its condemnations against such behavior. It
sustains that these men should behave as the government employees that they are and not
cause such trouble.177
Not just this but now the American government was admitting to fault in the
actions that these men took. The second committee on oversight that focused on Paravant
came to discuss how failures of oversight had led to these situations. They concluded that
their policy to not give these men much oversight had led to such actions becoming
common in the Middle East. Clearly, that stance taken shows some effort of the American
government to try and make changes on this issue. After so long of ignoring it they were
willing to take steps to keep this from becoming a major issue once again. Admitting fault
is also important as it shows that willingness to make changes to a system that had gotten
no attention for years. The fact it was before the completion of the second trial also shows
that commitment. Certainly, this would be the time to making that commitment as the
period before the second trial was when some of the worst relations between America and
Iraq were ongoing, the expulsion of those remaining Blackwater employees having
happened only weeks prior to this committee on oversight.178
Whatever the effect the ongoing use of private contracting will have is hard to say
at this point. It will most likely remain important and a factor to America’s relations with
other nations anywhere American military assets are deployed. These companies have
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only barely declined from what they were at the height of the system. When Blackwater
was removed from its contract after Nisoor Square it was instantly replaced by another
company. The world environment also holds a slew of opportunities for private security.
Both the Middle East and hotspots across the world are an open invitation, as the
American military cannot handle every single issue on the face of the Earth. The flaws of
this system aside, it will find a demand to supply as private individuals in war have
always done, though the attempts to alter the current state of affairs after the fall out with
Iraq may see these people become far less vital to American missions than they once
were and currently are. Many in the government still call for them to phased out when
possible.179
While the United States has proven willing to make changes to how these private
contractors are dealt with and the guidelines they are given in the field, there has certainly
been damage done. The mission in Iraq suffered a great deal as these private contractors
were the sources of some of the greatest tensions of the occupation. Such tensions
plagued both the early parts of the occupation as well as the period when American
withdrawal was being discussed. Their actions and American response to them led to
Iraqis feeling that they were worth nothing to the Americans and those Iraqis in power
feeling that they might never regain sovereignty. The American government after 2008
put great efforts into disproving both of those, and there was some success in those
efforts. Whether Iraq and its people will ever forgive these actions or early American
reaction to them remains an unknown.
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It is also important to note that the story is still unfolding as well. Blackwater may
have collapsed and weakened the use of contractors as no company has grown to fill that
previous role that Blackwater once filled. Despite that, many of the actors that took part
are still active. Prince has been trying to reassert some political clout after the most recent
election cycle and according to some media reports might have done so successfully.180
As well the events surrounding Blackwater and its rise are still so recent there may be
major changes in what is currently thought. There is some discussion that the Trump
administration may seek to overturn the convictions of the Nisoor square shooters. As the
story continues to develop there will be more to write about it and it should not be
forgotten as new evidence continues to surface. It seems that this story is going to be one
that was not to vanish along with the media moving on after the convictions of the Nisoor
shooters. With the major players, still active and parts of the story still developing, it is
hard to say where the story of contracting and the United States policy with them may
end up and it is likely to continue to off a wealth of information for those willing to study
it.181
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